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MULTILEVEL GOVERNMENTAL EFFORTS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY:
POLICY ADOPTION, IMPLEMENATION, AND EVALUATINO UNDER THE
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT (ARRA)

TAEKYOUN LIM

ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays studying the impact of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act in the energy policy field. The purpose of this research
was to evaluate the effectiveness of ARRA funds, spent as temporary funding, on the
change of energy efficiency policies, jobs, and technologies.
The first essay examined variation in local level energy-efficiency grants and
corresponding initiatives from American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) in the
United States. The analysis was based upon a hurdle model of counts of energyefficiency grants received by 348 local governments that received these grants from 2009
to 2013, as well as 348 matched local governments that did not receive such funds. Citylevel characteristics including amount of federal financial support, per capita income,
signaling of preferences for sustainability policies, manufacturing and political influences
were shown to be empirically important determinants of variation in local energyefficiency initiatives. The evidence suggested that all else held equal, the $21.8 billion in
ARRA funds expended with the intent of promoting the diffusion of local energyefficiency programs and policies successfully led to this end.
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The second essay examined the impact of the ARRA funds allocated through an
intergovernmental grant provision under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy (EERE) of the Department of Energy. The purpose of the second essay was to
evaluate the effectiveness of the large-scale federal ARRA grant provision implemented
under the EERE on job creation related to energy efficiency and renewable energy at the
sub-national level. In doing so, it focuses on whether federal ARRA investments,
designed to spur the U.S. economy through establishing an innovative energy
technologies in intergovernmental grant programs for state and local government,
effectively achieved their stated objectives of increasing job. Using the first difference
regression model with instrumental variables, the second essay examined the effects of
federal ARRA expenditures on job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable
energy sectors from 2005 to 2015. The evidence suggests that all else held equal, the
ARRA funds, implemented through the intergovernmental grant programs, successfully
led to job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors . The evidence
suggested that ARRA funds led to a productive cumulative return on job creation in
energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors during the period of ARRA.
The third essay analyzed whether federal ARRA investments, designed to spur
new energy technologies in grant programs for state and local government, effectively
achieved their stated objectives. The analysis was based upon a first difference
regression model with instrumental variables. This essay examined the effects of federal
ARRA expenditures on innovation activities in energy technologies from 2005 to 2015.
The evidence suggests that all else held equal, the ARRA funds, implemented under the
decentralized networks, successfully stimulated innovative activities in energy
v

technologies. Results also showed that ARRA funds led to productive cumulative return
on innovation activities toward alternative energy technologies and energy conservation
technologies during the ARRA period.

vi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

On February 17, 2009 President Barack Obama signed the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) into law. The ARRA was a single-shot game allocated in
short period of time and as a one-time grant program to support national economic
recovery during the Great Recession. It included explicit goals for stimulating the
economy through new job and technology development in health care, sustainable energy
production and transmission, and improvements to federal and local facilities and
infrastructure. The purpose of ARRA was to:
“(A) Preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery
(B) Assist those most impacted by the recession
(C) Provide investments needed to increase economic efficiency by spurring
technological advances in science and health
(D) Invest in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure
that will provide long-term economic benefits
1

(E) Stabilize state and local government budgets, in order to minimize and avoid
reductions in essential services and counterproductive state and local tax
increases”1
The ARRA relied heavily on instruments of networked governance system. Under
the ARRA implementation, federal managers were dependent upon local networks to
achieve national policy outcomes. Federal officials were also consigned to work within a
networked governance system through existing networks of state, local, nonprofit, and
business actors in order to accomplish program goals and provide needed services. The
ARRA mandated unprecedented transparency for designated expenditures by state and
local governments, nonprofit organizations, and private contractors, to spend stimulus
funds as quickly as possible. Energy policy under the ARRA funds had also tended to
focus on the local ground-level aspects of service delivery. Each state government
decided how to allocate its share of the funding to local governments as well as nongovernmental entities. State and local governments had fragmented and independent
authority to craft their actions to match each of their unique circumstances. Overall, the
subsidies from ARRA funds did not change hierarchically-oriented federal, state and
local relationships, but, they did have the networked governance system for stimulating
collaboration between state and local government as well as federal and local
governments.
The ARRA had been emphasized in implementation shifted from ‘government’ to
‘networked governance’ in achieving public goals (Conlan et al., 207). In the public

1

Public Law 111-5, it was goals cited as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.

2

administration studies, networked governance is a concept that tries generally to capture
the blurring of boundaries between the public and private sectors, and the rise of multisector networks and partnerships in implementing public sector policies and programs
(Frederickson, 1997; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Stoker, 1998). Related to the notion of
networked governance are the market-oriented challenges to the traditional bureaucratic
model of public administration embodied in the New Public Management (NPM)
(Morgan, 2010). This concept emphasizes values such as flexibility and competition
(Kaboolian, 1998). Blair (2000) suggests that decreased federal involvement and support
forces states and local in the United Sates to be more creative and innovative in devising,
organizing, financing, and implementing these types of activities. In the literature on
networked governance, scholars have long recognized many issues of the actual effects of
networked governance within the process of engaging various public and private agencies
in the implementation of government programs. For example, Robert Agranoff and
Michael McGuire (2003) have investigated the role of networks in local public and
nonprofit service delivery arrangement. They provided valuable lessons about the
effectiveness of networks which launched a more sophisticated discussion of the roles
that various actors, including public managers, play in local, community-based initiative.
McGuire (2000) also offered limited evidence that the presence of innovative governance
system might induce higher levels of collaboration in cities. Posner (2013) mentioned
that these approaches pose uniquely difficult challenges for both accountability and
performance in federal programs.
Consequently, the ARRA provided an ideal testing ground for exploring the
federal role in diffuse policy implementation networks (Conlan et al., 2017). However, no

3

published research has yet examined empirically the effectiveness of the networked
governance system in the implementation of the American Recovery Reinvestment Act.
Furthermore, the policy literature lacks compelling evidence of the effectiveness of the
networked governance tools that were used at the energy policy under the ARRA.
Accordingly, this dissertation has tended to focus on the effectiveness of energy policies
implemented under the networked governance system in a three-essay format.
Specifically, each essay of this dissertation focused on the energy efficiency grants were
used as a tool of networked governance within the context of mutual relationships among
federal, state, and local governments.
This three-essay dissertation seeks to contribute empirical insights in terms of a
set of broader conceptual frameworks that are inherently related but remain disconnected
in the scholarly literature, and concurrently advance policy knowledge about the effects
of American Recovery Reinvestment Act within the energy sector. Specifically, this
dissertation was grounded in the networked governance framework as a commonalities
between three essays into the context of evaluating ARRA expenditure for energy. It was
intended to serve as a step toward evaluating how well the governments was achieving its
statutory mission and goals, what have we learned about the Recovery Act, and what the
discrepancy was between public perceptions of governmental performance and realities
on the ground. All three essays contain empirical analyses focused on the local and state
ground-level evaluative aspects of whether ARRA funds effectively achieved their stated
objectives. The research approach of each essay was tailored to its guiding research
question and the inherent limitations of the available secondary data. Particular attention
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is given to the selection and application of each empirical model in an effort to maximize
the statistical and external validity of the combined analysis.
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

ARRA under Networked Governance
Essay 1

Essay 2

Essay 3

Impact of the ARRA
funds on the adoption of
local energy efficiency
programs

Impact of the ARRA
funds on the job creation
counted in the categories
of energy efficiency and
renewable energy

Impact of the ARRA
funds on the innovative
activities in the categories
of alternative energy
production and energy
conservation

The first essay examined the impact of the ARRA energy funding on local
government energy-efficiency programs and policies. The following specific questions
were considered. Under what general circumstances, if any, were more energy-efficiency
grants received and initiatives taken at the local government level? What factors explain
variation in ARRA stimulated energy efficiency activity at the local governmental level?
The system for making and obtaining local energy efficiency grants from ARRA
funds did not change the usual, top-down, hierarchically-oriented federal-state-local
relationships. They have a somewhat unique structure in that local government were
required to take self-initiative to compete within the federal funding process. This essay
primarily focused on the effects of the ARRA funds supported through the six programs
used a competitive process for making their awards: (1) Energy-efficiency and

5

Conservation Block Grants; (2) State Energy Program; (3) Weatherization Assistance
Program; (4) Energy Efficient Appliance Rebated Program; (5) Energy Assurance and
Planning Program; (6) Energy-efficiency and Renewable Energy Program.
To determine whether, on the margin, ARRA energy funding affected the
numbers of local government energy efficiency grants received, and programs and
policies adopted, the empirical model was tested based first upon propensity score
matching to identify a set of cities as similar as possible to those that received the funds,
except that they did not receive any such funds. Then a hurdle model was used to predict
the number of ARRA energy efficiency grants, using controls for the similar cities. The
analysis was based upon a hurdle model of counts of energy efficiency grants received by
348 local governments that received these grants from 2009 to 2013, as well as 348
otherwise similar local governments that did not receive such funds.
This essay showed that the $21.8 billion in ARRA funds expended with the state
intent of improving energy efficiency did indeed stimulate the sought for energy
efficiency initiatives, and adoption of local energy efficiency programs and policies.
Model results reveal that the competitive process for acquiring ARRA grants at the local
level seems to have been an effective mechanism for the diffusion of more energy
efficiency programs and policies, at least in the short term. Model results demonstrated
that city level characteristics including the land size, per capita income, signaling of
preferences for sustainability policies, manufacturing and political influences were
empirically important determinants of variation in local energy efficiency initiatives. The
empirical results indicates, however, that although one-shot federal spending may not be
optimal for achieving longer term improvements, the short term expenditures led to
6

effective performance in terms of promoting the diffusion of energy efficiency policies,
at least in the short term and at the local level.
Job creation was the primary goal of the Obama administration’s American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The second essay focused on how the ARRA
funds had performed in creating jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy
sector. This essay evaluated the effectiveness of ARRA funds with an empirical
assessment of the relationship between the total amounts allocated through
intergovernmental grant provision under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy (EERE) of Department of Energy (DOE) and the number of jobs counted in
energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors. The primary research question of this
essay was as follows: what factors influence the success of the implementation of federal
ARRA-related energy policies at the state government level? This essay framed a
conceptual definition of successful implementation by assessing whether the desired
results were met. This essay focused on whether this implementation under the Recovery
Act achieved job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors. The jobs
in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector, were estimated both in terms of (1)
energy efficiency, and (2) energy renewable sources sub-categorized in the category of
“Green Goods and Services (GGS)” defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS).
The second essay tested whether the ARRA expenditure, as a one-time event, led
to a spike in job creation in the energy sector or whether it has long-term impacts on job
creation. This research used panel data of 49 states in the U.S. over the period of 20052015. For instance, this study also included lagged variables for the ARRA expenditure
7

allocated in selected energy programs in order to capture any lagged effects of the ARRA
funds in the previous year. To control for remaining omitted variable bias, this research
used instrumental variables for the ARRA expenditure on selected grant programs. Thus,
the second essay used two-stage models: this research conducted the first difference
analysis with instrumental variables approach to consider the assumption for the
endogeneity of the ARRA funds. This analysis was approached in first-difference twostage least squares (FD2SLS) estimation to control the assumption that lagged ARRA
variables may be correlated with the error term.
The second essay confirmed that cumulated ARRA expenditure made in
intergovernmental grant programs through the EERE led to higher levels of job creation
in energy efficiency, and renewable energy sectors. These positive impact of the
temporary ARRA funding may be impacted by the intergovernmental grant process. The
intergovernmental grants funded by the ARRA were designed to distribute funds to state
or local governments so that they could quickly spend on projects that would create jobs
and foster growth in their communities (Terman & Feiock, 2012). The second essay’s
empirical results showed that government funds implemented under these
intergovernmental grants process had positive impacts in short term to stimulate
employment in energy efficiency, and renewable energy sectors.
The third essay examined the determinants of the innovative activities included in
the categories of alternative energy production and energy conservation. This essay was
focused on whether federal ARRA investments, designed to spur new technologies
designed to improve alternative energy and energy conservation effectively achieved
their stated objectives. The major purpose of this essay was to evaluate the effectiveness
8

of the ARRA funds, spent in grants at the state and local governments through
Department of Energy, on innovative activities in energy technologies. Counts of patent
application were used as proxies for innovative activities instead of patent publication
measured as innovation output. Although patent applications may not translate into
practice, their counts have the potential for most accurately representing the outcomes for
technological innovative activities (Johnstone et al., 2009). Relevant patent applications
were measured at the individual patent level, with using codes issued by the USPTO’s
Green Technology Pilot Program.
In this vein of inquiry, I conducted the first differenced analysis with instrumental
variables approach so as to appropriately consider the endogeneity of the ARRA funds.
The research included years both before and after ARRA from 2005 to 2015 to observe
the impact of ARRA funds. This research evaluated the effectiveness of ARRA
expenditures as measured by total amount spent in seven grant programs aimed to
promote upgraded energy efficiency technologies under the DOE’s Office of Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). These seven grant programs account for the
vast majority if not all of the ARRA expenditures made for improving energy efficiency
and greenness. Also, this research included two instrumental variables that did not enable
energy technologies’ innovation or promotion, but that may correlated with the level of
the allocated ARRA-Energy funds. As instrumental variables, I used the unemployment
rates and the total amount of ARRA funds spent under block grants based upon the
results of the validity of instrumental variables.
The results of this analysis demonstrate that ARRA expenditures spent in the
seven grant programs through the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
9

(EERE) led to significantly higher levels of innovation activities in energy technologies
in states in individual years. After one year of ARRA expenses, the ARRA funds under
the EERE led to significant and positive impacts on innovative activities in the
technologies of the alternative energy and the energy conservation, as well as combined
categories. However, after two years of ARRA expenses, the dollar amount of ARRA
funds under the EERE led to significantly negative impacts on innovation activities only
for the conservation energy technologies. Again, in three years after, the ARRA funds
under the EERE led to significant and positive impacts on the innovative activities in the
technologies of alternative energy and energy conservation as well as both categories.
The third essay concluded that innovation activities were strongly associated with
lagged long-run (delayed) effects of the government investments. It is very noteworthy
that temporary government funding evidently played a determinative role in directly
stimulating more energy technology-related innovative activities, in cumulated returns, at
the state level. In this perspective, innovative activities may be required extended
timeframes for their achievement. Empirical evidence indicated that delayed impact in
government spending should be considered to see more productive return on their
investment. Model results in the third essay also reveal that ARRA funds implemented
under the decentralized networks had an important impact on innovation activities related
to energy technologies during the period of the ARRA. It means that state governments
established their achievement in the program, designed with their authority to meet
production targets, under the ARRA. These accomplishments have the implication that it
is important to inject decentralized delivery systems in aspect of how should be able to

10

design the federal expenditure more efficiently for promoting of innovation activities
toward energy technologies in the future.

11

CHAPTER II
DETERMINANTS AND EVALUATION OF LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY
INITIATIVES FROM THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
(ESSAY 1)

Introduction
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was a large-scale shortterm federal initiative passed in 2009 as a Keynesian macroeconomic measure to support
national economic recovery during the Great Recession. It included explicit goals for
stimulating the economy through investment in sustainable energy (Recovery
Accountability and Transparency Board, 2015).

Unprecedented levels of federal

expenditures were made to promote advanced, efficient, and clean energy. The intent of
the Act included economic stabilization, job creation, job retention and regional wealth
creation. The expenditures played a key role in U.S. energy policy, primarily by supporting
state and local initiatives to adopt programs, policies and practices for purposes of
sustainable energy (Carley et al., 2014).
12

The high stakes and speed needed to implement the ARRA and ward off massive
recession placed a premium on decentralized and often informal collaborative networks of
people and groups in federal, state and local governments, as well as nonprofit and business
organizations. The widespread use of various indirect tools of governance in the Act’s
implementation, including grants, has raised “several theoretical puzzles” as well as a
“uniquely informative” opportunity to examine the theory of “how large scale federal
programs can be effectively implemented and held accountable in an era of indirect and
networked governance, about how political and governmental institutions respond to large
doses of fiscal shock therapy, and about the wide discrepancy between public perceptions
of governmental performance and realities on the ground” (Conlan et al., 2017, p. 6).
In accordance with practices of fiscal federalism, the federal government relied in
large measure on state and local actors to implement the federal policy goals in the ARRA.
One way this was done was through enactment of a process in which local actors had a role
in applying for and receiving new federal grants. One of the purposes of this essay is to
help gain a better theoretical understanding of how a set of local factors affected this
implementation process. An open question in the literature is about the reasons why some
local actors apply for grants under such new programs while others do not. While the
answer to this question remains largely out of reach, it has consequences for both the theory
and practice of fiscal federalism and for “the achievement of federal goals when the federal
government has no direct path to implementers and their implementation efforts” (Terman
& Feiock, 2014, p. 322). The better understanding I seek is important for purposes of
helping to identify which public finance functions are best centralized and which are best
located in more decentralized governmental and other agencies, among other things.

13

Although the factors that determine local participation in the implementation of
federal policy goals have been examined elsewhere in the literature, they have not been
considered explicitly in regards to whether they influence local actors in terms of their
decisions to apply for and receive newly established federal grants. The energy efficiency
grants furnished by the federal government under the ARRA are a case in point. The
question is: what if any identifiable conditions evoked local participation in achieving
federal policy goals through these newly established federal grant programs, and what if
any incentives encouraged local actors to choose to pursue them? Also, in what extent, if
any, were these conditions driven by political influences such as party affiliation and
representation (Inman 1988, Oates 1999, Porto & Sanguinetti 2001)? In helping to answer
these questions I also extend the research conversation found in Carley’s (2016) special
issue of this journal by providing practical insight into some of the details of the successes
of a range of ARRA expenditures vis-à-vis the experiences of localities in the energyefficiency field. I follow those papers in considering the context of the conditions faced
by local grant recipients and providing another step toward evaluating “what have we
learned about the Recovery Act, and what have we learned from the Recovery Act”
(Carley, 2016a, p.119).
Recent research has started to examine the actual effects of energy-related ARRA
expenditures. Some has looked at how state capacity affected funding of energy programs
(Carley et al., 2014; Terman & Feiock, 2014a; Terman, 2015; Terman et al., 2016). Other
focused on assessment of the experiences of a range of national actors during the ARRA
period (Tonn et al., 2016; Carley, 2016). Still other examined the effectiveness of related
intergovernmental grant management or collaborative contract management (Terman &
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Feiock, 2016; Lachezar, 2016). However, although the literature provides good reason to
expect that the ARRA energy-efficiency expenditures substantially influenced levels of
local government energy activities, no published research has yet examined the
determinants of local-level success in the process of competing for ARRA energyefficiency grants. Neither has any study provided an overview in terms of the implications
of the ARRA expenditures for the future of federally funded sustainable energy-efficiency
programs and policies. Accordingly, this research examined the impact of ARRA energy
funding on local government energy-efficiency programs and policies. The following
specific questions were considered. Under what general circumstances, if any, were more
energy-efficiency grants received and initiatives taken at the local government level? What
factors explain variation in ARRA stimulated energy-efficiency activity at the local
governmental level? These are answered first through a review of the relevant literature
and then through a quasi-experiment and a hurdle model designed to be as parsimonious,
plausible, and informative as possible.

Theoretical Framework: Fiscal Federalism and Local Energy Policy Adoption
The fiscal federalism literature focuses, among other things, upon the relationship
between federal and subnational governments. A main assumption is that the federal
government plays the role of establishing a comprehensive framework and local
governments then implement their own programs for meeting the performance targets
written into federal goal statements (Rabe, 2011). The preferences held by federal and
local governments are assumed to be aligned (Nicholson-Crotty, 2008) and federal policies
are assumed to be designed to integrate all levels of government, including state and local

15

(Handley, 2008). Furthermore, it is assumed that this alignment and integration may be
accomplished through intergovernmental grants to state and local governments and other
activities in a manner that conforms to federal policy goals (Mueller, 2003). Local
government is thus viewed as a subnational extension of the national government, with key
roles in the production, provision and delivery of public services (Cho, 2005).
The grants and initiatives investigated in this research were funded by the ARRA
through the US Department of Energy from 2009 – 2013. They went directly to local
agencies so that they could quickly be spent on programs, projects and policies that would
foster growth in their communities (Terman & Feiock, 2014a).2 Table 1 shows the six
categories of ARRA funded grant programs included in this research.

Table 1. Categories of Energy-efficiency Projects funded under the Department of
Energy’s ARRA

Office of EnergyEfficiency and
Renewable Energy

Categories of
Energy-efficiency
Projects







Energy-efficiency and Conservation Block
Grants
State Energy Program
Weatherization Assistance Program
Energy Efficient Appliance Rebated
Program
Energy Assurance and Planning program
Energy-efficiency and Renewable Energy
Program

Source: Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board. 2015

For the most part, the system for making and obtaining the new local energyefficiency grants from ARRA funds did not change the usual, top-down, hierarchically-

2

Some funds were awarded directly to local government by the federal government on a competitive
basis. Others passed through state government to local government in accordance with the guidelines of the
federal governments, still on a competitive basis.
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oriented federal-state-local relationships. But they did have a somewhat unique structure
in that local governments were required to take self-initiative to compete within the federal
funding process (Conlan et al., 2017, p.75). Specifically, the grant programs with this
structure included the Energy-efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG) funds,
for which the expressly stated intent was to make federal funds available locally for
purposes of supporting sustainable energy initiatives. The EECBG program directly
funded 59% of the total ARRA energy-related funding allocated by the federal government
at the city level (DOE, 2011). The other major set of such expenditures were those made
under the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP).

Expenditures for the WAP

accounted for 30% of the total amount of ARRA energy related funding allocated by the
federal government at the local level (Sissine, 2012). Terman and Feiock (2012) remarked
that such direct local expenditures were the most straightforward possible mechanism to
accomplish both federal and local energy sustainability goals while bringing better
adoptability and responsibility as well as a reduction in bureaucratic redundancy and cost
(Terman & Feiock, 2014a).
ARRA directed EECBG and WAP grants to local governments based upon the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The EECBG program specifically
provided “non-entitlement cities” with the opportunity to compete for funds for energyefficiency improvements. These were cities not officially designated by the federal
government as being among the largest in each state. Although most federal funds under
the WAP were awarded in the form of formula grants, some were provided to nonentitlement cities in the form of competitive funding through categorical formula grants.
These competitive grants were designated for programs that disbursed and managed
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activities for upgrading heating and air conditioning equipment, and implemented other
energy conservation measures (Conlan et al., 2017, p109). Special targets for WAP
assistance included energy-efficiency initiatives for the low-income elderly, disabled, and
families with children, all of which were handled by the US Department of Energy (DOE).
The DOE made grants to state governments, which then passed the funding through to
competitively successful local governments, nonprofits, as well as public community
agencies that oversaw the weatherization work. State governments relied on existing local
agencies to implement WAP under the ARRA; local agencies were hired through a
competitive bidding process (Conlan et al., 2017, p.122). Similarly, funds allocated
through the Energy-efficiency and Renewable Energy Program (EERE) also used a
partially competitive process through categorical grants for making awards.

The

application processes were available for local governments, as well as private entities and
nonprofit organizations. The Energy Efficient Appliance Rebated Program (EEARP), the
Energy Assurance and Planning Program (EAPP), and the State Energy Program (SEP)
also dedicated a portion of their funding temporary to provide competitively awarded
financial assistance over the ARRA period (Goldman, 2011).
Expenditures under all of these programs were uniform in the sense that when
allocating funds, federal policy makers used standard criteria and language that were
consistently applied across places without any sort of explicit, place-specific criteria
written into them. For instance, they required, without respect to any considerations of the
circumstances of any particular locale, demonstration that, in general, only those locales
with capacity to expend funds effectively could receive them. But they did not provide a
list or otherwise enumerate any sort of determination as to whether or not any particular
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locale had such capacity. Rather, it was up to the particular locale to make its own case for
its own capacity. Thus, the statements of uniform federal policy goals were blind to the
particular circumstances of local governments, even though some of these local
circumstances played a crucial role in determining levels of policy adoption (Handley,
2008; Wheeler, 2008).
Local governments have a wide range of different characteristics, capacities and
preferences, and they face a range of regional economic, social and historically contingent
circumstances which differentially affected the likelihood that they might adopt and
implement federally funded energy-efficiency programs. Moreover, as is recognized by a
growing body of literature, all of these ideographic factors must be identified and
systematically considered if one is to convincingly establish the impact of federal
expenditures at the local level (Lyon & Yin, 2010; Sapat, 2004; Sharp et al., 2010; Portney,
2003; Feiock et al., 2010). Accordingly, a number of such factors have been identified, as
described in the following subsections.
Federal Financial Support
Evidence indicates that the levels of available fiscal resources affect magnitudes of
state and local energy initiatives. Clark and Whitford (2011) investigated the effects of
grants provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at the state level,
finding evidence for a “flypaper effect” in which the more money a state received from the
federal government, the more opportunity it had to apply those funds to more programs.
States with greater fiscal resources thus had more environmental policies. Similarly Krause
(2011), while investigating the factors that explain variation in policy adoption at the local
level, found that higher levels of per capita general revenue in a given city tended to
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motivate more climate-related initiatives and policies.

Wang (2009) showed that

California cities’ climate actions were influenced by fiscal capacity. Hawkins et al. (2017)
tested the hypothesis that cities with higher levels of own source revenue are more likely
to invest in financial capacities that are intended to support sustainability, finding evidence
that the relationship between local fiscal capacity and commitment for sustainability
priorities is nonlinear. Accordingly, I hypothesized that cities that received more energyrelated ARRA funds would undertake more energy-efficiency initiative and adopted more
related policies and programs.
Economic and Demographic Characteristics
All ARRA funds were delivered to cities of more than 50,000 population and their
adjacent urbanized clusters of at least 2,500 and less than 50,000 people. Previous
research has shown that a number of city-specific characteristics are relevant at this level
in determining more local energy initiatives.
The first such characteristic is city size. Lubell et al. (2009) found that increased
city size, measured in terms of land area, tended to increase the level of activity for
sustainable use of energy. In particular, cities with larger land size tended to adopt more
energy-efficiency programs and policies.
Secondly, as a rule, the invention, commercialization, and adoption of energyefficiency practices and energy saving technology requires a significant investment (Koski
& Lee, 2014; Sharp, Daley, & Lynch, 2010; Lyon & Yin, 2010). Previous studies have
thus examined whether per capita income is associated with variation in levels of energy
efficiency initiative. The prevailing theory has been that people with lower-incomes are
less likely to be able to afford programs and policies oriented around energy-efficiency
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technologies, so innovative energy technologies are more likely to emerge and diffuse from
within cities with higher income levels. In this case, however, given that WAP grants in
particular were intended to subsidize weatherization of the homes of primarily low-tomoderate-income households, I expected that cities with higher per capita income would
adopt fewer energy-efficiency policy programs.
Thirdly, previously published research suggests that the size of the population
influences energy efficiency initiatives, programs and policies. Less populated, sprawled
cities tend to be less energy-efficient (Balbo, 1993). On the other hand, higher urban
populations tend to present more opportunities for increases in energy-efficiency
attributable to their greater dependency on commercial products and services relative to
rural populations (Clancy, Maduka, & Lumampoa, 2008). More highly populated cities
with greater concentrations of human resources and economic activities also tend to have
correspondingly greater energy demand, largely attributable to the corresponding demand
for urban infrastructure and greater energy consumption (Madlener & Sunak, 2011).
Evidence furthermore suggests that urbanization leads to economies of scale which provide
opportunities for increases in energy-efficiency (Sadorsky, 2013). Population-related
patterns such as these seem likely to place policy makers in more highly populated urban
communities in circumstances in which they must concentrate more on both energyefficiency and related pollutant emissions. Therefore I expected that cities with a greater
population would take more energy-efficiency initiatives and receive correspondingly
more grants.
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Preference for Energy-efficiency Policies
Several studies have examined the relationship between policy preferences and
policy choice. Some city governments prefer relatively more stringent policies and
standards for achieving reductions in GHG emissions and enhancing sustainability. One
indicator of this is membership in the International Council for Local Environmental
Initiatives (ICLEI) (Krause, 2010; Yi & Krause, 2017). ICLEI membership obliges cities
to participate in programs for sustainability, achievement toward innovative environmental
governance, and clean energy-efficiency (Yi & Krause, 2017). Such preference has been
shown to correlate with the institutionalization of sustainability programs in specialized
units within local governments (Kwon, Jang, & Feiock 2014, Sharp et al., 2010). Thus I
anticipated that, all else equal, ICLEI member cities would have taken more initiative and
established more energy-efficiency programs and policies relative to non-ICLEI cities.
Local government participation in climate protection initiatives is likely to signal
an interest in energy-efficiency, and therefore to predict the decision to compete for ARRA
energy-efficiency grants. Climate Protection Agreements are developed as part of longerterm plans to achieve Green House Gas emission reduction and improvements in
environmental conditions. The presence of these agreements can signal a preference for
efforts toward sustainable and efficient energy policies. Thus, I expected that cities which
had signed climate protection agreements would have taken the initiative to obtain more
ARRA energy-efficiency grants than cities that had not signed them.
Variation in levels of education between cities has been shown to influence levels
of environmental preservation and willingness to embrace and actively support sustainable
use of energy (Inglehart & Abramson, 1994; O’Connell, 2008; Portney, 2008).
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Accordingly, I expected cities that have a higher level of education would take more
initiative and receive more ARRA energy-efficiency grants.
Manufacturing Influence
Following other local environmental policy research (Krause, 2011; Sharp et al,
2010; Lyon & Yin, 2010, Koski & Lee, 2014), a greater presence of manufacturing firms
is likely to have the effect of depressing environmental policy actions as a result of their
tendency to avoid extra costs for energy-efficiency or energy saving. For example, lowcarbon technologies or advanced technologies for clean energy or energy-efficiency, which
tend to be more expensive than standard technologies, may not be popular, especially for
older, established manufacturing groups, even though these technologies may contribute
to a reduction of CO2 emissions. Therefore, I expected that all else held equal, cities with
a greater presence of manufacturing firms would take fewer energy-efficiency initiatives
and adopt fewer related programs and policies.
Political Influence
Local governments’ political orientation has been recognized as a factor that affects
policy adoption. Previous research indicates that cities with an ideology aligned with the
Democratic Party may be more likely to prefer governmental intervention in environmental
and sustainable use of energy policy (Lubell et al., 2009). The political circumstance of a
local government evidently not only affects policy choice, but also policy implementation
(Peters, 2002).
The state’s political orientation is reflected in the preferences of state legislators
and the nature of the constraints in the policy adoption process (Clark & Whitford, 2011;
Bressers & O’Toole, 1998). Accordingly, recent studies assessing the effectiveness of
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energy policies have incorporated variables that represent states’ political circumstances.
Using the environmental scorecard of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), Delmas
et al. (2011) for instance found that the presence of a Democratically-controlled state
government and a majority of Democratic representatives was positively associated with
the adoption of renewable energy policies and investment in energy infrastructure. Also
using the LCV, Shrimali et al. (2015) found that states with more Democratic control
tended to have a greater collective preference for environmental protection and to have a
positive and significant correlation with the deployment of wind energy. Other empirical
studies have also found that states with a higher LCV rating were positively linked to the
adoption of environmental policies, including energy policies (Clark & Whitford, 2011;
Carley, 2009; Delmas & Mones-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011). Therefore, I
expected to find that cities with high percentage of total votes that supported the
Democratic candidate are more likely to adopt more energy-efficiency policy programs.
Government Type
In recent research, the direct influence of government structures has started to
appear to be a significant determinant of local energy-efficiency policies. Typically, the
form of government consists of either an elected mayor-council structure, with an elected
mayor as a chief executive, or a council-manager structure, with a professional manager
hired by the elected council (Svara & Nelson, 2008; Nelson & Svara, 2015). Accordingly,
Bae and Feiock (2013) found that various forms of government differentially provide
greater opportunities for cities to engage in joint problem solving and to learn new policy
approaches to address sustainability actions. Kwon, Jang, and Feiock (2014) recently
assessed how government structure affects the adoption of energy policies. Specifically,
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they examined 172 California cities to determine the factors that influence the level of
climate protection and energy sustainability policy action. They hypothesized that cities
with more political obstacles tended to undertake fewer climate protection and energy
sustainability policy actions. Specifically, their research suggested that professional city
managers who, compared to political officials, tend to care more about administrative
efficiency and productive performance for purposes of raising their personal career
reputations, may be less motivated to initiate and support environmental protection policies
directed to the community rather than governmental operations. On the other hand elected
mayors, who tend to be more concerned about issues of political responsiveness and
representation, were evidently more interested in taking climate protection and energy
sustainability policy actions in order to attract electoral support from environmental interest
groups in their community.
Kwon, Jang, and Feiock (2014) also analyzed survey data obtained from 8,569 local
governments in the United States in 2010, and concluded that a mayor-council form of
government takes 1.32 times more environmental conservation actions than cities without
this form. Similarly, Nelson and Svara (2015) found support for their conjecture that local
administrators tend to concentrate on their expertise rather than seeking diverse
opportunities in the adoption of public policy, and that they prefer to maintain a neutral
stand on controversial issues. If an issue causes a dichotomy of opinion between politicians
and administrators, such as energy-efficiency policies are likely to do, administrators are
less likely to adopt the policy, even though they are active in policy formulation. Deslatte
et al. (2017) found strong support for the influence of council-manager government on
sustainable policy innovation. Therefore, I expected to find that cities with a mayor-council
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form of government would take more energy-efficiency initiatives, receive more ARRA
grants, and start more related programs and policies.
Research Methods
A major purpose of this research was to examine the determinants of ARRA funds
in the competitive selection processes for energy-efficiency grants, along with their
associated activities, programs and policies. I tested hypotheses about the previously
mentioned variables using a quasi-experimental design based first upon propensity score
matching to identify a set of cities similar to those that received the funds, except that they
did not receive any such funds (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983; Dehejia & Wabha 2002). Then
I calibrated a hurdle model that predicted the number of ARRA energy-efficiency grants
on the basis of the previously considered variables, using controls for the similar cities.
To identify a set of cities similar to the 348 cities that received energy-efficiency
related ARRA funds, except that they did not receive such funds, I retrieved all of the
10,849 cities with a FIPS code assigned by the U.S. Census Bureau from American Fact
Finder. Prior to matching the observations were stratified by the four census regions:
Northeast, Midwest, South and West. Cities were matched with others in the same census
region on the basis of population density, since this was significantly correlated with the
outcome variable but not with the set of independent variables in the model (Sadorsky,
2013; Balbo, 1993). The matching process used 1:1 nearest neighbor matching with
replacement, matching cities by the nearest available propensity score (Dehejia & Wahba,
2002).3 A summary description of the resulting balance of the cities is provided in Table

3

Specifically, at each stage (a) one of the cities that had received ARRA funds was selected from a
randomly ordered list of cities in both categories, (b) a city with the closest propensity score was identified
and a match made, (c) the matched pair was removed from the pool, (d) the city that did not receive ARRA
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2. Hotelling’s T test results indicated no significant differences in the covariates between
the two groups of cities.

Table 2. Summary of Balancing Test
Census
Region
Northeast

Midwest

South

West

Matching Variables

Treatment

Comparison

F-value

P-value

Population Density 2009
Population Density 2010
Population Density 2011
Population Density 2012
Population Density 2013
Population Density 2009
Population Density 2010
Population Density 2011
Population Density 2012
Population Density 2013
Population Density 2009
Population Density 2010
Population Density 2011
Population Density 2012
Population Density 2013
Population Density 2009
Population Density 2010
Population Density 2011
Population Density 2012
Population Density 2013

6620.356
6696.430
6632.067
6636.477
6791.341
3432.400
3441.794
3484.592
3495.893
3505.044
2912.390
2925.729
2965.861
6052.481
3052.481
3121.486
3127.324
3158.631
3189.853
3223.113

6229.101
9285.100
6238.099
6336.477
6378.457
3430.351
3433.272
3436.644
3456.293
3474.742
2917.936
2926.130
2959.9369
3028.225
3028.225
3123.465
3128.982
3155.977
3182.304
3208.089

0.175
0.182
0.176
0.170
0.161
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.001

0.676
0.671
0.676
0.681
0.689
0.998
0.992
0.955
0.972
0.990
0.995
0.999
0.997
0.983
0.983
0.993
0.994
0.985
0.968
0.970

Note: the p-value of the test indicated that the matched the pairs are balanced at 5% level.

Conceptual Model
To determine whether, on the margin, ARRA energy funding affected the numbers
of local government energy-efficiency grants received, and programs and policies adopted,
all of the previously mentioned factors had to be statistically considered. This was done
using a hurdle model, first with a conditional logistic model to control for any differences

funds was put back in to the pool, and (e) the process was repeated with the next city until all 348 cities had
a pair.
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between cities that applied and received ARRA energy-efficiency grants and those that
could not or did not do so. Second, it used a Poisson count model truncated at zero to
estimate the effect of the covariates on the number of grants received by the recipient cities.
The analysis thus assumed an underlying process with two stages. The first stage generated
whether or not a city applied for and received and energy-efficiency grant and the second
generated the number of such grants received by the recipient cities;
Prob (Yi = 0) = fi (0)
1−𝑓i(0)

Prob (Yi = j) = 1−𝑝i(0) Pi (j), j=1, 2,…60
where fi(0) is the probability of the zero outcome, Pi(j) is the probability of the non-zero
outcomes conditioned on the outcome being greater than zero. Here, i represent the cities,
and j represent the number of ARRA energy-efficiency awards.

Data
Dependent variable
The dependent variable reflected the number of energy-efficiency grants received
at the local level from the six aforementioned ARRA funded programs (see Table 1). This
research assumed that ceteris paribus, cities that received more grants undertook more
activities and made more federally-funded progress in terms of greater energy-efficiency
relative to those that received fewer grants.

This research included all 348 local

governments in the 50 states that received federal money for one or more ARRA funded
projects for each year during the period from 2009 to 2013, as well as 348 additional cities
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selected through the matching process, as described above, for a total of 3,480
city/year/grant observations.4
Independent variables
The empirical model represented the factors that, on the basis of previous research,
might have influenced federal government ARRA expenditures. See Table 3 for a
description and the source of each independent variable in the empirical model. The
categories of these variables coincided with those considered above, including (1) federal
financial support, (2) economic and demographical characteristics, (3) preference for
energy-efficiency policy, (4) manufacturing influence, (5) political influence, (6)
government’s types, and (7) education attainment.5
Financial support by the federal government was measured by total amount of
federal grants awarded for the six programs under the categories of energy-efficiency
project between 2009 and 2013. The economic and demographic characteristic variables
included (a) land size, (b) per capita personal income, and (c) population. Land size
reflected land area in square miles in the city proper, and population reflected the entire
corresponding population. Per capita personal income was in 2013 inflation-adjusted
dollars. Preferences for energy-efficiency policies reflected whether or not a city was a
member in good standing of ICLEI-USA in the respective year. Member cities were coded
‘1’, nonmembers ‘0’. It also reflected whether or not the city’s mayor had singed the

4

The data are available at (http://www.recovery.gov/arra/FAQ/Pages/DownloadCenter.aspx ). They
are based on recipient reports made available by the Department of Energy.
5

Two of these variables, population and land size, are time constant in that within any given city they
change either very slightly, or not at all over the study period. Tests for pathologies in the error terms of the
hurdle model, however, indicated that these variables did not produce significant serial autocorrelation in the
estimates.
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Climate Protection Agreement by 2009. Signed cities were coded ‘1’, nonmembers ‘0’.
Next, in regards to the effect of the presence of manufacturing, previous research has
suggested that states in which manufacturing accounts for a major part of all industrial
employment and output are less inclined to adopt policies related to clean energy or energyefficiency, probably because of an aversion to incurring extra costs (Krause, 2011; Sharp
et al, 2010; Lyon & Yin, 2010, Koski & Lee, 2014). Thus, the model included the number
of establishments within the manufacturing sector in each city. Previous research has also
shown that the presence of a Democratic governor and a majority Democratic
representatives are likely to be positively related to the adoption of energy-efficiency
programs and investment in energy-efficiency infrastructure (Park, 2015; Clark & Whitfor,
2011). Thus, the model included the percentage of each city’s total votes that supported
the Democratic candidate in the 2012 presidential election. The city government type was
a dummy variable coded ‘1’ for a council-manager structure and ‘0’ for others. Finally, I
operationalized educational attainment in terms of the percentage of the population over
the age of 25 with a BA degree. The analyses also included dummy variables representing
years, to account for year-specific factors potentially affecting the number of energy
efficiency initiatives not otherwise captured by the other independent variables.
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Table 3. Variable Measurements at the Local Level
Variables
Dependent variable
Policies Adoption

Measurements
Number of contracts, grants
adopted in categories of Energyefficiency Programs, 2009-2013

Independent variable
Federal Financial Support

The amount of cities’ obligated
ARRA funds that were actually
issued for energy-efficiency
programs at the local
government level, 2009-2013

Economic and Demographic
Land size
Income
Population
Preference for Energyefficiency Policy

Manufacturing Influence

Political influence

Government Type

Education Attainment

1)Land Area in Square Miles
2)Per Capita Personal Income
adjusted in 2013 dollars
3)Number of whole population
1)The Presence of ICLEI
membership in a city (1=
presence, 0=otherwise)
2)Dummy variable indicating
whether or not each city had
signed the Climate Protection
Agreement
(1= presence, 0=otherwise)
Number of establishments by
the manufacturing sector in each
city
The percentage of each city’s
total votes that supported the
Democratic candidate in the
2012 presidential election
Cities with the presence of a
council-manager form
(1=presence, 0=otherwise)
Percentage of Population over
the age of 25 with a BA or
higher
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Data Source
Department of energy Data
Reported by the American
Recovery and
Reinvestment
Act(www.recovery.gov)
Department of energy Data
Reported by the American
Recovery and
Reinvestment
Act(www.recovery.gov)

U.S. Census Bureau

International Council for
Local Environment
Initiatives (ICLEI),
U.S. Conference of
Mayors, Mayors Climate
Protection Center

U.S. Census Bureau,
County Business Patterns,
NAICS 31-11
CQ Voting and elections
Collection
Yearbooks of the
International City/County
Management Association
U.S. Census Bureau

Results
Table 4 presents the relevant descriptive statistics for the 2009- 2013 period. The
number of grants received by the cities ranged from 0 to 60 with a mean of 0.508 and
standard deviation of 2.744. The amounts of these grants, again considering all cities,
ranged from $0.00 to $1,971,000,000 with an average of $5,633,965 aggregated over the
period of the study. Substantial variation existed among the cities in terms of size,
demographic composition and government structure.

The city with the smallest

geographical footprint was 0.028 square miles and the largest was 606.422, with a mean of
27.858. Per capita personal income ranged from $12,917 to $160,956 with a mean of
$49,610. As for the remaining variables, 11% of the cities had membership in the
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) membership; population
ranged from 120 to 3,897,940, with a mean of 80,449, and 76% of the cities had a council
manager system of government.
In terms of climate protection agreement, 32% of the cities had in place as of 2009
a climate protection agreement with a U.S. Green House Gas reduction goal.

The

percentage of the city’s population over age 25 with a BA degree or higher ranged from
2.7% to 68.6%, with a mean of about 18.95%.

Manufacturing influence varied

considerably, in the range of 0 to 4,956 of the number of establishments by manufacturing
sector, with a mean of about 23.51. Finally, in regards to political support variables, the
percentage of each city’s total votes that supported by Democratic candidate ranged from
8.5% to 87.4% means of close to 50%.6

6

Examination of the correlation matrix revealed that none of the covariates were highly correlated.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Energy-efficiency Grants and Initiatives
ARRA Fund ($1,000,000)
Land Size (in square miles)
Per Capita Personal Income ($1,000)
Population (1,000)
ICLEI
Climate Protection Agreement
Manufacturing Influence
Political Influence
Government Type
Education Attainment

Mean
0.508
5.633
27.858
49.610
80.450
0.113
0.321
23.514
49.175
0.765
18.950

SD
2.744
58.882
57.209
19.936
241.058
0.317
0.467
195.627
12.226
0.423
7.366

Min
0
0
0.028
12.917
0.12
0
0
0
8.5
0
2.7

Max
60
1971.731
606.422
160.956
3897.94
1
1
4956
87.4
1
68.6

Note: N = 3480

Table 5 presents the results of the hurdle model, including both the conditional
logistic model designed to control for which cities did and did not apply for grants and the
zero-truncated Poisson count model designed to predict positive counts of grants received.7
The goodness of fit results of the Poisson count model with all of the independent variables
had a deviance of 1048.881, indicating that the model provided a reasonable description of
the data with a p-value of less than 0.05. Also, the log likelihood ratio chi-square test, LR
χ2 (14) = 1923.90, p < .001, indicated that the full model with ten predictors had a
significantly better fit than the null model. I also used Ramsey’s RESET test to indicate
whether there were any important omitted variables. The results of Ramsey’s RESET test
were not indicative of any regression pathologies (Gujarti and Porter, 1999. p.215-217).
The coefficient estimates from the conditional logistic model are presented in terms
of the natural logs of likelihood values. Accordingly, for each $1M increase in the amount
of the grants, the probability that a local agent would apply for and receive a grant relative

7

Tests for pathologies in the model provided no indication of problems. Variance inflation factor
(VIF) values in the multicollinearity tests were all less than 2.0. Likelihood ratio tests indicated no evidence
of any significant over-dispersion.
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to not increased about 54 times. The probability that cities with a council-manager form
of government would apply for and receive a grant was about 214 times greater relative to
cities without this form. The probability was much greater that local agents would apply
for and receive a grant in 2010, relative to not, and much less in 2013. Otherwise, the
statistically significant evidence indicates that neither a city’s per capita personal income
nor the influence of manufacturing in the city was of any consequence in determining
whether that city would apply for a grant. None of the other coefficients were statistically
significant.
In terms of the count model, as American taxpayers might hope, all else held equal,
increases in levels of ARRA expenditures significantly increased the number of energyefficiency initiatives and corresponding programs and policies at the local level. Not
surprisingly, cities with somewhat higher per capita income tended to adopt more energyefficiency programs. Cities with more-general preferences for adopting such policies, as
signaled through ICLEI membership, and cities with somewhat greater support by political
influences also received more grants and adopted more programs and policies. As
previously mentioned, cities with more manufacturing establishments tended to receive
fewer grants and to adopt significantly fewer energy-efficiency programs and policies.8

8

The coefficients on the year dummies were consistently significant, positive, and increasing over
the time of the ARRA, when compared to the base year.
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Table 5. Impact of Local Characteristics on Energy-Efficiency Policy Adoption by
ARRA Energy-Efficiency Subsidies
Parameters of Count Model Equation
Dependent variable: number of grants in each recipient city
Coefficients
Robust Std.
P-value
Constant
-10.111***
1.053
0.000
Financial Support (ARRA funds)
0.591***
0.051
0.000
Land Size
-0.002
0.002
0.347
Income
0.019**
0.008
0.011
Population
0.000
0.000
0.410
ICLEI
1.502***
0.299
0.000
Climate Protection Agreement
-0.101
0.325
0.755
Manufacturing Influence
-0.001**
0.000
0.016
Political Influence
0.010***
0.012
0.005
Government Type
-0.216
0.543
0.691
Education
0.000
0.018
0.999
Year_2010
0.217
0.142
0.125
Year_2011
0.522***
0.141
0.000
Year_2012
0.788***
0.177
0.000
Year_2013
0.954***
0.207
0.000
Parameters of Conditional Logistic Model Equation9
Dependent variable: 0 = city with no grants, 1 = city with at least one grant
Coefficients
Robust Std.
P-value
Constant
-22.971***
3.118
0.000
Financial Support (ARRA funds)
3.995***
0.567
0.000
Land Size
0.021
0.199
0.288
Income
-0.047***
0.014
0.001
Population
-0.002
0.003
0.472
ICLEI
2.370
1.898
0.212
Climate Protection Agreement
-1.778
1.212
0.142
Manufacturing Influence
0.002***
0.000
0.000
Political Influence
-0.155
0.143
0.277
Government Type
5.368***
1.308
0.000
Education
-0.123
0.063
0.152
Year_2010
2.739**
1.272
0.031
Year_2011
0.164
1.197
0.891
Year_2012
-4.933
3.419
0.149
Year_2013
-11.233***
1.288
0.000
Notes: ** p<0.05, p<0.01***
Omitted category: Calendar year 2009

9

The coefficients from the conditional logistic model are given in terms of logs of likelihood ratios.
These mean, for example, the probability that manufacturing influence distinguished cities that received at
least one grant relative to the probability that it did not is positive and significant. Positive coefficients imply
that greater values of the corresponding variable tended to amplify the probability that applicants in a city
would receive a grant relative to the probability that they would not. Conversely, negative coefficients imply
that increased values of the variable tended to inhibit receipt of grants. The larger the absolute value of the
coefficient, the greater the degree of amplification or inhibition.
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Discussion
During the 2008 and 2009 recession, the Obama administration used ARRA funds
for macro-economic purposes of helping to recover from the recession. A substantial
amount of federal expenditure occurred directly at the local level, and this was designed to
stimulate local energy-efficiency. This research has shown that the $21.8 billion in ARRA
funds expended with the stated intent of improving energy-efficiency did indeed stimulate
the sought-for energy-efficiency initiatives, and that it increased levels of adoption of local
energy-efficiency programs and policies. It also showed that local factors tended to at least
partially determine the levels of these initiatives. All else held equal, when financial
support for energy-efficiency within any given city increased, so did the numbers of
energy-efficiency grants and initiatives.

Federal government expenditures can thus

evidently play a central role in directly stimulating more energy-efficiency policies at the
local level.
In regard to research question about how local factors affect the application and
receipt of new federal grants, the probability that local actors will participate significantly
increases when the amounts of the grants increase and when the local government has a
council-manager form. Also, in contrast to previous research indicating that political
influences would have discernable effects on participation, the results were inconclusive.
Taken together, these results lead us to cautiously infer that the choice to participate in the
ARRA energy efficiency grant programs was more the result of professional decisions to
improve energy efficiency than of political ones to advance any sort of partisan or other
normative agenda.
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In regards to the extent of participation, which is to say the number of grants
received by cities that received at least one of them, one of the specific expectations was
that those cities which signaled a preference for efforts to promote sustainable energy,
energy conservation, or energy saving would adopt more energy-efficiency programs and
policies. Consistent with this expectation, I found that the presence of local government’s
voluntary networks, such as ICLEI membership had a significant positive effect on
promoting more energy-efficiency initiatives. City governments have increasingly joined
this network to better achieve sustainable energy, energy conservation, or energyefficiency. Differing preferences and priorities of the citizenry of various cities are
reflected in related policy decision-making processes, and those local citizenries that take
sustainability issues more seriously are probably apt to apply for ICLEI membership. This
research’s findings suggest that local government participation in such voluntary programs
as these are significant in promoting energy-efficiency initiatives.
The results also provide empirical confirmation for a number of specific
hypotheses. Political ideology in city can evidently exert significant influence on local
energy-efficiency initiatives, programs and policy adoption. The results indicate that
cities are more likely to adopt more energy-efficiency programs and policies if they have
a higher percentage of residents supporting Democratic candidates. This is consistent
with previous results showing that Democratically-oriented political ideologies are
associated with a higher likelihood of adopting environmental and energy policies toward
sustainable energy.
As I also expected, the empirical evidence indicates that cities with a greater
presence in manufacturing industries are less likely to adopt more energy-efficiency
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programs. Evidently, from a manufacturing perspective, federally funded programs and
policies supportive of improvements in local energy-efficiency are not always necessarily
everything they are chalked up to be among the public at large. While this result may be
counter-intuitive, it is nevertheless the one predicted by Jevon’s Paradox. That is, Jevon’s
Paradox predicts that manufacturers will see increases in energy-efficiency as being a route
to aggregate increases in total energy demanded and consumed, not decreases. Moreover,
unless any given manufacturing firm’s own decrease in cost per kWh attributable to
energy-efficiency exceeds its share of the aggregate cost increase attributable to increased
aggregate demand by all affected firms, the net effect of federally funded energy-efficiency
programs would be to increase the firm’s cost of energy. In any case, despite the fact that
manufacturing firms have tremendous economic significance in some cities, in some
instances to the point of being the city’s economic lifeline, a higher presence of such firms
in a city was, in the data, empirically associated with fewer ARRA grants and
correspondingly fewer energy-efficiency initiatives, programs and policies.
The fact that per capita personal income had a positive effect on the number of
grants received contradicted the expectation that, because of the prevalence of WAP grants,
energy-efficiency initiatives would be less frequent in cities with higher income levels. But
it is consistent with the alternative line of reasoning in which cities with higher income
levels are more likely to be able to afford to undertake more innovations and therefore may
have more motivation to undertake energy-efficiency initiatives relative to cities with lower
income levels.
The statistically insignificant coefficients on several of the variables were
unexpected on the basis of previous research, including education, population, land size,
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government type, and Climate Protection Agreement. In regards to education variable, the
level of education did not have any relationship at all with the numbers of grants received.
In regard to population and land size variables, although the expectation was that larger
populations and more land area would predict more energy-efficiency initiatives, evidently
population and land variables measured at the local level do not have any relationship at
all in this regard. Also, although local government scholars have investigated the impacts
that forms of government have on policy choices to seek protection of the environment,
and for sustainable energy, the findings indicate that a mayor-council government does not
influence energy-efficiency initiatives or the adoption of related programs and policies.
Indeed, although local government scholars have in the past found that a city’s membership
in the Climate Protection Agreement is associated with a higher likelihood of adopting
environmental and energy policies, the findings indicate that the presence of a Climate
Protection Agreement does not influence energy-efficiency initiative or the adoption of
related programs and policies.
While the empirical model established that ARRA funding succeeded overall at
stimulating local initiatives, it also has implications in terms of how to design cost-effective
federal expenditure policies for energy-efficiency.

With the ARRA, the federal

government provided state and local governments with a specified temporary amount of
funding designed to address broad purposes of energy efficiency. The ARRA thus provided
a testing ground for exploring the federal role in diffuse energy-efficiency policy adoption,
including competitive block grants, project-specific categorical grants, as well as formula
grants. Together, they seem to have comprised an effective mechanism for the diffusion
of more programs and policies, at least in the short term. Although further research might
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be conducted to separate and tease out the differences between the levels of effectiveness
of each of these types of grants, this research has shown that, should the need arise for
further federal expenditures for energy-energy in the future, taken together they are
effective. Past this point, the most efficient and effectively-targeted expenditure policies
would evidently be those that direct relatively larger expenditures specifically toward
physically higher income, Democratically-oriented cities with less manufacturing
influence, and ones that signal their preference for environmental protection by such means
as membership in the ICLEI.
Finally, it is worth briefly pointing out that the use of the hurdle model is not only
appropriate but highly desirable in this and a range of similar contexts in which the
underlying process has two stages. Public administration scholars often encounter such
contexts. In this research for instance, in the first stage of the process, cities self-selected
to apply for and receive ARRA energy-efficiency grants in any given year, or not. In the
model, cities that received one or more grants were thus first distinguished from cities that
received no grants at all. Then, in the second stage, for those cities that received at least
one grant, the number of grants received was determined. The basic idea is that a Bernoulli
probability governs the binary outcome of the first stage, and then, if the outcome is
assigned a positive value then the “hurdle” is crossed and the conditional distribution of
counts for all observations that crossed it is governed by a truncated-at-zero count data
model. The structure of this model is thus suitable for a wide range of research applications
in the public administration and policy fields.
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Conclusion
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was the largest federal
energy-efficiency investment in U.S history.

The awards it provided helped local

governments and agencies to make countless initiatives toward developing and adopting
energy-efficiency programs and policies. At the same time, it is important to examine and
evaluate the choices made and programs and policies undertaken as a result of this
investment, as a means of informing energy policies in the future. Without well-designed
policy evaluations, it will remain difficult, at best, to say whether policies have the effects
stipulated in statements of legislative intent.
Accordingly, this analysis of the ARRA energy-efficiency expenditures made
directly to local levels shows clearly that the $21.8 billion in ARRA funds expended with
the stated intent of improving energy-efficiency actually led to more energy-efficiency
grants, programs and policies within local communities. It also established a range of
determinants of the levels of initiative taken by the various cities that received these grants.
ARRA-funded energy-efficiency grants were a one-time federal investment or
single-shot stimulus in the energy policy field (Carley, 2016a). The grants were thus
limited in the sense that continuous local-level improvements through similar investments
in the future would require the long term stability and predictability of similar investments
by the federal government (Terman et al., 2016). Although one-shot federal spending may
not be optimal for achieving longer term improvements, the empirical evidence herein
suggests that the short-term expenditures led to effective performance in terms of
promoting the diffusion of energy-efficiency policies, at least in the short term and at the
local level. From this viewpoint, future research should include empirical study of whether
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short-term investment might be important for achieving longer-term energy-efficiency
policy goals. Future studies are also needed using Bayesian multilevel models to determine
the impact of previously enacted state policies on the adoption of related local policies, as
well as other models and data to examine competing perspectives concerning the use of
block grants versus other grant mechanisms to achieve national sustainable energy goals.
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CHAPTER III
JOB CREATION GENERATED BY THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND
REINVESTMENT ACT: EVIDENCE FROM THE SECTORS OF THE ENERGY
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY (ESSAY 2)

Introduction
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was a large-scale shortterm federal initiative passed in 2009 as a Keynesian macroeconomic measure to support
national economic recovery during the Great Recession. Job creation was important in
the ARRA. ARRA’s immediate goal was to stabilize the economy and preserve and
restore jobs (Conlan et al., 2017). The goal of the ARRA funds was to invest in the
foundation for a robust and sustainable 21st century economy (Charles, 2011). Over $ 90
billion of ARRA funds was invested in energy projects that improved long-run
productivity through the development of sustainable energy technologies. These
investments covered renewable energy generation, clean transportation, energy
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efficiency, grid modernizations, advanced vehicles and fuels, carbon capture and storage,
and green innovation.
The primary goals in the Department of Energy (DOE) under the ARRA included
rapid job creation, job retention in energy use, and energy savings. The ARRA funds had
played an important role in the rapid growth in the renewable energy and energy
efficiency market. The federal government expected that roughly 5 million new jobs
would be created as a result of ARRA investments (Charles, 2011).
Recently, performance assessments of the energy programs created under the
ARRA have received considerable attention (Carley et al., 2014; Terman et al., 2016).
Researchers have studied the ARRA implementation process (Carley et al., 2014; Terman
et al., 2016), state experiences with the ARRA (Carley, 2016), and the effect of ARRA
funds on specific programs such as the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) (Tonn
et al., 2016). However, although the literature provided sound reasons to expect that the
ARRA expenditures supported many jobs, no published research has yet examined
empirically how the ARRA funds performed in creating jobs with regard to energy
efficiency and renewable energy sector. Accordingly, this study empirically evaluated the
effectiveness of the ARRA funds on job creation generated in the energy efficiency and
renewable energy sector by focusing on the impact of federal energy programs spent in
the Department of Energy (DOE) under the ARRA. In particular, this research focused
on the impact of the ARRA funds allocated through each contract or grant provision
within the DOE under the ARRA.
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Grants or contract programs funded through the DOE under the ARRA had
tended to focus on the state and local ground-level aspects of service delivery. Overall,
the subsidies from the ARRA did not change hierarchically-oriented federal-state-local
relationships. However, allocation through grants or contract provisions were dependent
on state or local networks to achieve national policy outcomes. In addition, each state
government decided how to allocate its share of the ARRA funds to local governments as
well as non-governmental entities. Thus, this research focused specifically on the
effectiveness of energy policies implemented through grant or contract provision under
the ARRA funds. Nevertheless, tax incentive or tax credit programs did not rely on the
DOE’s approval regarding their criteria of allocation.
The ARRA of 2009, commonly called the “stimulus,” was designed to spur
economic growth while creating new jobs (Conlan et al., 2017). Many ARRA projects
focused on immediately jumpstarting the economy. Some projects, such as those
involving investments in energy technology, were expected to contribute to economic
growth. Ultimately, the objective of renewable energy, or energy efficiency policies
implemented under the ARRA was concentrated on energy-related jobs creation through
promoting new advanced clean technologies (Carley, 2011; Mundaca & Richter, 2015).
This research was intended to evaluate whether the ARRA achieved its stated objective
of increasing job creation. Accordingly, this research reviewed the definition of
implementation and the meaning of its related “success”. Next, this research described a
theoretical approach to successful implementation. Then, this study described and
statistically tested the hypotheses related to the factors that influence successful job
creation in the sector of efficient energy and producing energy from renewable sources in
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the short-term (2009-2013 years), as well as in mid-term (2007-2013 years) and longterm (2003-2013 years) periods. In the short term approach, this research focused on
assessment of the impact of ARRA funds on job growth in the energy efficiency and
renewable energy sectors.
Theoretical Framework: Successful Implementation of Federal Energy Policy
Policy refers to the principles or intentions that guide specific actions, such as
specific legislative acts or programs (Palumbo et al., 1984). Policy is programs that are
implemented. Programs can be aimed at achieving a particular policy (Palumbo et al.,
1984). Procedures in the programs are also intended to accomplish statutory goals.
In the public administration literature, scholars have pointed that policy outcomes
are theoretically dependent on the implementation activities. Specific goals and welldesigned interventions are essential for successful implementation (Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1973). Ong (2012) also identified that successful implementation requires
several factors: purposeful attention, procedures and processes to overcome internal and
external barriers, explicit and quantifiable objectives to monitor progress, ongoing
assessments to identify implementation problems, and a willingness to revise and refine
efforts when required.
The majority of empirical research on general assumptions of the successful
implementation has been focused on whether administrators strive to meet performance
goals (Hood, 2006; Terman & Yang, 2013). In particular, few qualitative studies have
highlighted the problems associated with policy implementation of the ARRA (Carley et
al., 2014; Terman et al., 2016). They defined the concept of successful implementation
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that stated goals were accomplished in the planned timeframe and without exceeding
budgetary constraints. They concluded that implementation delays was one factor that
hinders successful policy implementation under the ARRA. However, despite the goals
under the ARRA expected to have more tangible outcomes such as creating jobs and
cutting electricity bills, no empirical studies have been analyzed the effectiveness of the
ARRA expenditures targeted in job creations.
Accordingly, this research framed a conceptual definition of successful
implementation by assessing whether the desired results were met. This research focused
on whether implementation under the Recovery Act achieved job creation. Specifically,
this study was focused on the job creation counted in the energy efficiency and renewable
energy sector.
ARRA Funding
Funding and investment at the intersection between economic development,
energy policy and planning has been on the rise over the last decade (Carley, 2016). Most
recently, ARRA provided a wide array of policy instruments to stimulate the U.S.
economy and establish a robust technological infrastructure for long-term economic
growth (Aldy, 2013). ARRA was designed to emphasize the connection between
economic development and energy policy by specifically targeting the energy sector.
Approximately $60 billion were spent on the energy sector (U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2009) on renewable energy, energy efficiency, smart grids, and advanced fossil
fuel energy programs among multiple others. Much of the ARRA funding was designed
to support existing energy programs, but some funds were dedicated to new energy
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programs focused on energy planning and economic development (Carley et al., 2011). In
particular, the ARRA had overall goals: (1) create new jobs and save existing ones, (2)
spur economic activity and invest in long-term growth (Hall & Jennings, 2011).
Recent research has started to examine the actual effects of energy-related ARRA
expenditures. Specifically, the Council of Economic Advisers (Executive Office, 2016)
estimated that ARRA clean energy-related programs supported roughly 900,000 jobs in
innovative clean energy fields between 2009 and 2015. Link and Scott (2012) discussed
how Small Business Research (SBIR) programs in the U.S. created and administered by
such agencies as the Department of Defense, and the National Institutes of Health,
NASA, and the U.S. Department of Energy can be credited with an average of about 42
new jobs per $1,000,000 of government award funding. However, most assessments on
the relationship between ARRA expenditures and its actual effects have focused on the
general effects inferred from all federal ARRA funds rather than expenditures
specifically designed for energy.
Furthermore, still no published research has yet examined the impact of the
ARRA funds implemented under the intergovernmental grant. Federal ARRA funds
allocated under the EERE of DOE relied on networked governance system through
existing networks of state and local. State and local governments, under the DOE,
designed their programs and procedures and allocated the ARRA funds at their own
discretion. The ARRA funds were passed through state governments with their direction
to competitively award the funds to local governments. It was managed by state office
with their own discretion, not by federal DOE governments. In other words, each state
government decided how to allocate its share of the funding to local governments as well
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as non-governmental entities. Under the these structure, some state spent larger amount
of ARRA funds activity their programs in their own discretion with more ARRA money,
other states might not or did not do so. However, most of ARRA funds studies focused
on national-level impacts, neither has any study tested empirically on the association
between spent ARRA expenditures and energy relevant job creation at the state level.
Accordingly, this research hypothesized that state governments that spent a larger
amounts of ARRA funds were more likely to create more jobs in the energy efficiency
and renewable energy sector.
Subnational Government Capacity
Scholars have long recognized that the capacity of subnational governments is
essential to the implementation of federal policy (Derthick, 1970; Elazar, 1984; Gamkhar
& Pickerill, 2012; Hall et al., 2011; Jennings et al., 2012; Carley et al., 2015). The term
of the capacity is broadly defined as the ability of organizations to carry out their
missions and achieve their goals (Ingraham, Joyce, & Donahue, 2003). Capacity, defined
in various ways, has been shown to correlate with implementation success for all three
levels of government, federal, state and local (McDermott, 2006). State capacity is
especially crucial to the efficiency with which federal dollars are spent (Carley et al.,
2015). Subnational capacity includes inputs such as labor and finances (Honadle, 1981;
Hall, 2008; Carley et al., 2015), and depends on the stock of institutional, organizational,
and individual resources (Honadle, 1981; Bowman & Kearney, 1988). The presence of
greater capacity of all types in subnational governments can lead to greater progress
toward their policy goals and implementation (Hall, 2008).
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A rich theoretical body of scholarship has analyzed empirically the relationship
between subnational government capacity and the variation of policy outcome.
Specifically, Terman and Feiock (2014) investigated the relationship between energy
policy outcomes and local administrative capacity based on a principal-agent theory.
Specifically, they estimated administrative capacity in terms of the number of financial
management staff members in a municipal government per 1000 residents. They
measured implementation timing, defined as the deviation in days of delay for each
energy project implemented, and used it as a dependent variable. Their result showed that
lack of staff capacity had a statistically negative effect on energy policy implementation.
Although the federal government provides increased funding with various training and
technical support opportunities to help implement energy efficiency and conservation
projects, it is important to ensure sufficient local staff for proper policy implementation.
Also, Krause et al (2014) assessed the sustainability programs in US cities based on
interest group support, governmental capacity, policy characteristics, and institutional
structures. The authors suggested that relationships among numerous specialized
departments and agencies are important to facilitate sustainability efforts, and those
institutional environments shape the motivations of local government officials.
Furthermore, they linked fiscal resources to policy performance. This research argued
that establishing an office focused exclusively on sustainability is likely to involve
substantial start-up costs. One of their areas of interest, the support from local
environmental groups, was measured based on data the Integrated City Sustainability
Database (ICSD) of 2005. The results showed that local governments with greater
financial resources and institutional environments with greater support from
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environmental groups had a significantly positive effect on sustainability policy
management in the executive branch at the city level.
In terms of the ARRA process, Carley and Hyman (2014) asserted that multiple
local and state governments, much like the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), were
unprepared to implement ARRA’s requirements (in terms of lacking sufficient qualified
personnel, or relevant policies and procedures to handle extensive amount of ARRA
funds) in the required time frames. Government data, provided by the Recovery
Accountability and Transparency Board, demonstrated that there were spending delays
both within and outside of government and that ARRA was significantly more difficult to
implement in a timely manner than policymakers intended; some states also encountered
more difficulties than others. Therefore, based on these previous findings, this research
hypothesized that state governments with larger expenditures allocated by federal
government are more likely to create more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable
energy sector.
Furthermore, this research considered the impact of the non-government
expenditures as mechanisms consists of voluntary collaborations that are made between
government agencies and non-government donors in supporting mutual initiatives.
According to DOE’s strategic investment in science and technology, State Energy Office
(SEO) was inviting proposals funded by cooperative agreements, between government
and private industry (DOE, 2014). Specifically, the projects related to the Clean Coal
Power Initiative and America’s Next Top energy Innovator, as well as Energy Innovation
Portal are implemented through federal programs with non-governmental funding. Even
though these programs operate out of the state government, their participation is never
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funded by this SEO. In theoretical perspective, non-government funding’s participation,
provided by external entities like non-government organization, have been recognized as
important strategies to expend their effectiveness into broader trends associated with the
energy policy (Carley, 2011). However, the effectiveness of the decentralized fiscal funds
in the implementation stages of energy policy have not been investigated empirically.
Therefore, this research considered the categories of expenditure allocated by the nongovernment sources on activities that are specifically related to energy. This study
expected that state governments with larger magnitudes of non-government expenditures
are more likely to have more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector.
Political Influences
It is generally argued that liberal political ideology is associated with green
energy policies and renewable energy programs (Yi & Feiock, 2014). The ideological
propensity of the governor and the legislators not only shapes the support for green
energy regulations, but also influences innovative green energy technologies’
development and diffusion (Coley & David, 2012). Stable and predictable political
circumstances are essential for the deployment and development of green energy. Recent
research has analyzed the direct relationship between states with a democratic governor
and policy implementation outcomes (Carley et al., 2015; Jennings et al., 2012; Delmas
& Montes-Sancho, 2011; Lyon & Yin, 2010). These studies have stipulated that
democratic governors may have tighter goal alignment with the Obama administration’s
stimulus program and seek to implement the programs more efficiently and effectively.
According to Jennings, Jennings and Zhang (2012), ARRA was a highly politicallycharged policy. Democrats strongly supported President Obama’s claims that ARRA
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would create jobs, while zero Republicans in the House and only three Republican
senators cast votes in favor of the bill. In this context, the findings of Jennings, Hall and
Zhang, Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, and Fisher (2015) confirmed a relationship between
political affiliation and states’ ability to spend on energy. Delmas and Montes-Sancho
(2011) demonstrated how political influence can affect energy policy by showing that the
percentage of House and Senate seats in the states’ government occupied by Democrats is
positively and significantly related to the effectiveness of RPS policies. Lyon and Yin
(2010) also found that states with a strong democratic presence were more likely to adopt
an RPS. Based on these findings, this research expected that states served by Democratic
governors were more likely to successfully create jobs in the energy efficiency and
renewable energy sectors.
Circumstances that Use Renewable Energy Sources
Following other local environmental policy research (Ong, 2012; Yi, 2014;
Krause et al., 2015), a greater presence of firms that use renewable energy is likely to
provide more job opportunity for green business or employment that are specifically
related to renewable energy or efficient energy. If state have industry or establishment
that use more renewable energy, it may be able to attract more employment opportunities
in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector. Therefore, we expected that all else
held equal, states with a greater circumstances that use renewable energy resources in
electric power generation are more likely to create more jobs in the energy efficiency and
renewable energy sector.

53

Economic Characteristics
Following previous studies, state-specific economic characteristics are always
relevant in the growth of clean or green energy. The first such factor is the overall level
of state economic activities, as characterized by greater per capita gross domestic product
(GDP). A recent study found that the higher a state’s per capita GDP, the larger the
market size in the state, which creates a sufficiently large market to achieve economies of
scale for green energy or clean energy and for related industries to develop and grow (Yi,
2013). Bowen et al. (2013) confirmed that empirical evidence consistent with the positive
impact of per capita gross state product (GSP) on increasing in green business. Porter
and Stern (2001) showed a positive relationship between creation of the green jobs and
per capita GSP, which was a main determinant for patterns of technological performance.
Thus, this study expected that state governments with vibrant economies are more likely
to have more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector.
Secondly, in the literature on the relationship between population density and job
creation. Previously published empirical research also demonstrated that greater
population sizes tend to present more job opportunities to provide services of efficient
energy or renewable energy. They argued that if a state has greater population, it may
have a greater chance of creating new innovative technologies (Sadorsky, 2013). More
highly populated states with greater concentrations of human resources also tend to have
correspondingly more green jobs employed for installation and maintenance (Madlener &
Sunak, 2011). Moreover, this study expected that more highly populated state with
greater concentrations of human resources are more likely to have more jobs in the
energy efficiency and renewable energy sector.
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Research Methods

Conceptual Model
The purpose of this research was to analyze the factors that influence job creation
in the sectors of efficient energy and producing energy from renewable sources. This
research focused on the impact of the ARRA funds allocated through intergovernmental
grant provision under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) of
the Department of Energy. This research tested whether the ARRA expenditure, as a onetime shot, leads to a spike in job creation in the energy sector or whether it has long-term
impacts on job creation. This research used panel data of 49 states in the U.S. over the
period 2005-2015. All of the previously mentioned factors had to be statistically
considered.
To isolate the effects of the ARRA funds, this research first included a set of
control variables to account for those confounding factors. In addition, this study also
included lagged variables for the ARRA expenditure allocated in selected energy
program in order to capture any lagged effects of the ARRA funds in previous year. To
control for remaining omitted variable bias, this research used instrumental variables for
the ARRA expenditure on selected grant programs. Thus, this research estimated twostage models: This research conducted the first differenced analysis with instrumental
variables approach to consider the assumption for the endogeneity of the ARRA funds. It
was approached in first-differenced two-stage least squares (FD2SLS) estimation to
control the assumption that lagged ARRA variables may be correlated with the error
term. All results included robust standard errors to adjust for potential heteroscedasticity
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and serial autocorrelation in the model (Wooldridge, 2003), this was done with allowing
fixed effects.
The analysis assumed an underlying process with two stages. The first stage
generated whether or not ARRA funds (endogenous variable) associated with
instrumental variables and the second generated the model captured the two effects
included the direct effect from the explanatory variables, and the proxy effect from the
omitted variables:
′
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡 + 𝜋2 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦_𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝜋3 𝑋𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜗𝑠𝑡

(1)
In the first stage equation (1), 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡 represents the total amount of
federal ARRA expenditures allocated in seven grant programs (See Table 8) under the
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) by the Department of
Energy, under the ARRA, in state s, and individual year t. This research included two
instrumental variables that did not enable job creation or promote, but it may correlated
with the level of the allocated ARRA funds. As instrumental variables, this research used
the 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡 which means the amount of ARRA funds spent under the block grant
types in state s, and individual year t, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦_𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 which means policy
duration that has been adopted Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and Energy
Efficiency Resources Standards (EERE). This study expected that two instrumental
variables are highly correlated with the 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 it which means total amount of
ARRA expenditures allocated in seven energy grant programs under the Office of Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE).
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′
𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑇+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆 + 𝜗𝑠𝑡

(2)
In the second stage equation (2), 𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is the total number of jobs
counted in energy efficiency and energy from renewable sources in the classification
identified in the Green Goods and Services (GGS) in state s and year t. In all equations,
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠(𝑡−𝑖) represents the total amount of federal ARRA expenditures allocated
in seven energy grant programs under the EERE, under the ARRA, in state s, and
individual year t with lag length of i. It was meant lagged effects of total amount spent in
seven energy grant programs by EERE under the ARRA. The lag length of i was used
from one year to three years. The appropriate lag length was determined by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) (Popp, 2016). Where 𝑋′𝑠𝑡 was a vector of independent
variables including government financial capacity, political circumstance, renewable
energy circumstances, and economic characteristics in state s and year t was error term
into identically distributed state-effect term.
Data
Dependent variable
The dependent variable reflected the number of jobs created in the energy
efficiency and renewable energy sectors. This research used the definition of category of
“Green Goods and Services” (GGS) as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). This study focused only for the first and second categories of energy efficiency
and energy from renewable sources (See Table 6). This research did not include all 5
categories of GGS as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (energy from renewable
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sources; energy efficiency, pollution reduction and removal; natural resource
conservation, and environmental compliance). The first and second categories, within the
GGS, were counted as a proxy for jobs related to the energy efficiency and renewable
energy (See Table 6).

Table 6. Classification of the Green Goods and Services (GGS)

1
2
3
4
5

Classification of the Green Technology under Green Technology Piot Program
Energy from Renewable Sources
Energy Efficiency
Pollution Reduction and Removal, Greenhouse Gas Reduction, and Recycling and
Reuse
Natural Resources Conservation
Environmental Compliance, Education and Training, and Public Awareness

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Retrieved from https://www.bls.gov/ggs/

Independent variables
The empirical model represented the factors that, on the basis of previous
research, might have influenced in energy-related job creations. See Table 7 for a
description and the source of each independent variable in the empirical model. The
categories of these variables coincided with those considered above, including (1) ARRA
funds, (2) subnational government capacity, (3) political circumstances, and (4)
circumstances that use renewable energy sources (5) economic characteristics.
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Table 7. Variables Measurement
Variables
Dependent Variable
Job in Energy
Efficiency and
Renewable Energy
Sector
Independent Variable
ARRA Funds

Sub-National
Government
Capacity

Political
Circumstances
Circumstances that
Use Renewable
Energy Sources
Economic
Characteristics

Instrumental Variable
ARRA Funds in
Block Grant
Circumstances of
State Energy
Policy

Measurements
The number of jobs counted in energy
efficiency and energy from renewable
sources, into the definition of category of
Green Goods and Services (GGS) as
defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
1) Total amount of federal ARRA
expenditures spent in 7 grant
programs under the Office of Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy
(EERE) ($10,000,000).
2) The lag length was used from one
year to three year ($10,000,000).
1) Total amount of federal expenditures
annually allocated by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE)
($10,000,000)
2) Total amount spent under the federal
DOE program through nongovernment funding participation
($10,000,000)
State with a Democratic governor (1
indicating the governor is a Democrat
and 0 if not)
Number of establishments that use
renewable energy resources

Sources
Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS)

Department of Energy
Data Reported by the
American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act
(www.recovery.gov)

USASPENDING.GOV
(www.usaspending.gov)

Multistate Associates
Incorporated (MAI)
U.S. Census Bureau

1) Per capita Real GDP adjusted in
2015
2) Number of people residing per
square mile of land

Census of Governments
and Bureau of
Economic Analysis
( BEA)

1) Total amount of federal ARRA
expenditures spent under the
CCDBG, CSBG and CDBG
2) Duration of Renewable Portfolio
Standards (RPS) and Energy
Efficiency Resources Standards
(EERE), in years

Bureau of Labor
Statistics(BLS),
Database of State
Incentives for
Renewable & Efficiency
(DSIRE)
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This study used federal government ARRA expenditures awarded through
intergovernmental grants under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
(EERE). The variable contained observations of the total amount spent in seven
intergovernmental grant programs aimed to energy efficiency and renewable energy
innovation under the EERE (See Table 8).
This research expected that the ARRA expenditures spent in intergovernmental
grant programs, intended to support the energy efficiency and renewable energy, would
be associated with the job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector.
Because, the ARRA goal was intended to create new jobs, with the perspective of energybased economic development, within strategies to produce new advanced energy
technologies (Carley et al., 2014). Indeed, this research employed ARRA expenditure’s
lagged variables with length of three years to address the short-run and long-run effects
of ARRA expenditures. It had been represented as the cumulative effects of the ARRA
expenditures for the past three years. Accordingly, this research used the amount of the
ARRA funds that were actually spent in the seven intergovernmental grant programs
under the EERE of the DOE aimed to promote renewable energy or energy efficiency
(See Table 8).
In order to conduct the analysis at the state level, this research focused on selected
seven intergovernmental grant programs that were managed by State Energy Office
(SEO), not by the federal DOE. According to implementation process for selected energy
programs, each state decided how to award these sub-grants at their own discretion. The
recipients of these grants were determined by the state governments. SEO designed and
carried out their own renewable energy and energy efficiency program. They had
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responsibility to coordinate the development of projects and funds allocation. Thus, this
research focused on state level impact of the ARRA federal funds implemented through
intergovernmental grant program. The ARRA data were collected from Department of
Energy Data reported by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(www.recovery.gov).

Table 8. Intergovernmental Grant Funded under the DOE’s ARRA
DOE
Office

Grant Provision

Grant Purpose

1) Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Block Grants
2) Weatherization Assistance
Office of
Grant Program
Energy
3) State Energy Grant Program
Efficiency
and
Renewable 4) State Energy Efficient
Energy
Appliance Rebate Program
(EERE)
5) Advanced Battery
Manufacturing Grants
6) Transportation Electrification
Grants
7) Alternative-Fueled Vehicles
Grants

Grant for supporting energy conservation
in the transportation, building, and other
sectors and renewable energy development
Grant for purchase of the energy efficient
equipment for low income household
Grant for state-led energy initiatives. It was
aimed to promote the energy efficiency and
energy conservation.
Grant for the purchase of energy-efficiency
Energy Star products
Grant for developing advanced battery and
battery system
Grant for conducting demonstration
(evaluation) on advanced electric drive
vehicles technologies.
Grant for the purchase of alternative fuel
and advance technology vehicles

Source: Energy Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Retrieved from
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R40412.pdf

In addition, this research expected that state governments with greater financial
capacity were more likely to create jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy
sector. It focused separately on each category of expenditure allocated by the federal
government and non-government sources toward sustainable energy. Most state energy
programs that supported renewable energy or efficient energy relied on existing federal
government mandating spending. At the same time, government has also invited non61

federal expenditures as mechanisms consists of voluntary collaborations that are made
between government agencies and non-government donors in supporting mutual
initiatives. According to DOE’s strategic investment, they were inviting proposals funded
by cooperative agreements, between government and private industry (DOE, 2014). Even
though these programs operate out of the federal government, their participation was
never funded by this government. Accordingly, the magnitude of subnational government
capacity were estimated using two sources, specifically, (1) total amount of federal
expenditures allocated annually by the Department of Energy (DOE) , (2) total amount
allocated within federal DOE programs with non-government funding participation.
Relevant data were gathered from USA Spending (www.usaspending.gov).
Next, previous research has shown that the presence of a political orientation of
the Democratic are more likely to support to green economies that are associated with the
effect on the quality of the environment (Clark & Whitfor, 2011; Krause et al., 2014).
Therefore, this research expected state served by Democratic governors are more likely to
successfully create job in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector. The
independent variable related to political circumstances were measured by dummy
variable coded ‘1’ for state with a Democratic governor and ‘0’ for others.
Furthermore, this research has expected that the state with a great circumstances
that use renewable energy resources are more likely to create job in the energy efficiency
and renewable energy sector. Thus, the model included the number of establishments that
use renewable energy resources in the electric power generation industries. The industries
that use wind, geothermal, biomass, and solar electric power generation has defined from
the Economic Census under the North American Industry Classification System
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(NACIS). It has been counted at the six digit NAICS codes within six sub-categories (See
Appendix C); (1) Hydroelectric power generation (NACIS 221111), (2) Solar electric
power generation (NACIS 221114), (3) Wind industries (NACIS 221115), (4)
Geothermal (NACIS 221116), (5) Biomass (NACIS 221117). Data was retrieved from
the Census Bureau Economic.
In addition to the main variables of interest discussed earlier this research control
for state economic characteristics, including population density and per capita Gross State
Product (GSP). Previously published research suggests that population density influences
the level of green job creation (Balbo, 1993; Yi, 2014). If state area is experiencing a less
population density, energy-relevant job can hardly experience any growth. More densely
populated areas are expected to lead to increased demand for energy, which magnifies the
pressure for energy efficiency, resulting in government and utility investment in energy
efficiency and thus creating energy-relevant jobs. Population density was measured by
the number of people residing per square mile of land. Also, state’s economic
characteristics have been previously found to influence administrative implementation
and behavior (Portney, 2003). States’ wealth might impact the proportion of their funds
allocated for energy programs (Carley et al., 2014). Park (2015) argued that during the
Great Recession administrators were forced to slow down the increase in the green
energy sector and shift expenditures to social policies and elsewhere. Thus, this research
expected that that s states with vibrant economies were more likely to create jobs in the
energy efficiency and renewable energy sector. The data related to the conditions of the
state economies were collected from the U.S. Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis
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(BEA), and U.S. Census of Government. All relevant numbers were adjusted for inflation
and listed in 2015 dollars suing the GDP deflator.
Instrumental variables
The first instrumental variable was the total amount of federal ARRA funds spent
in three block grant programs aimed to provide federal grants to state or local
governments: (1) Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) program, (2)
Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) program and (3) Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) program. . Under the ARRA, block grant programs were designed
to stimulate innovation at the state and local levels (Conlan et al., 2017). The ARRA
funding, through the block grant programs, increased rapidly over the time period of the
ARRA (Dilger & Boyd, 2014). Specifically, state and local governments received $52.9
billion in the form of grant-in-aid funds under the ARRA (Conlan et al., 2017, p.33). This
funding was intended to reform federalism relationships as well as to reduce bureaucratic
redundancy and cost (Terman & Feiock, 2014). These funds were also allocated under
the decentralized framework. What this research proposes is that the funding of the
ARRA block grants was analogous to that of ARRA energy intergovernmental grants
implemented through the EERE. Because, governments tend to pursue similar reforms
(Urpelainem & Yang, 2017); when the ARRA energy funds were allocated under the
decentralized framework for simulating energy innovation, they were so allocated as to
mirror the funding of the block grants. Therefore, this research assumed that states with
greater ARRA expenditure spent in three block grant programs might be spent more
intergovernmental grant implemented under the seven programs of EERE.
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The second instrumental variable was the circumstance of state energy policy. A
comprehensive energy policy plan entails long-term commitments to enhance social
values and goals toward sustainable energy (Baumol & Oates, 1988). States differ by
existing policies and expertise accumulated through experiences in energy policy
implementation toward sustainable energy. For this reason, motivation to implement
energy policies tends to vary between state and municipal governments. Some states
respond with minimal efforts towards sustainable energy policies, other states have
implemented programs early and actively provided resources and diverse policy
instruments. In this context, one might expect that that governmental agencies with more
experience in state energy policy implementation have more accumulated information on
how policies can be better implemented, what is feasible or preferable, when agencies
should act to implement a policy, and what should be changed for better performance. In
this perspective, this research assumed that states with more accumulated implementation
experience related to state energy policies would have spent more energy related ARRA
grants.
For the instrument to be valid, this research confirmed that the total amount of
ARRA expenditures spent in the CCDBG, CSBG and CDBG, were highly correlated
with the total amount of ARRA expenditures allocated through seven intergovernmental
grant programs under the DOE’s EERE, but not directly related to variation of job
created in energy efficiency and renewable energy sector. The circumstances of state
energy policy was also correlated with the total amount of ARRA expenditures spent in
seven intergovernmental grant programs under the EERE (See Appendix D).
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According to the results of the first stage with the instrumental variables, there
was a strong positive association between the ARRA funds spent in three block grant
programs and the ARRA energy funds spent in seven intergovernmental grant program
under the EERE. Also, when the ARRA energy grant were spent under the EERE, there
was a significant difference between states with more accumulated implementation
experience related to state energy policies and those with less experience related to state
energy policies. Those states with more implementation experience related to energy
policies had higher rates of the ARRA funding expenditure in seven intergovernmental
grant programs. Thus, this research discovered that the potential drivers behind ARRA
energy investment were the amount of ARRA funds spent in the tool of block grants and
the circumstances of state energy policies.
In order to suggest validity of the instrumental variables, the week identification
test was used based on the F-statistic (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The results of this test
showed that the instrumental variables were strong. The F-statistic for the first-stage
regression analysis was consistently much larger than 10 (Table 9). A test of
overidentifying restrictions was performed in order to verify the validity of instrumental
variables. The null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are valid was not rejected.
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Table 9. First-Stage Results with Instrumental Variables (IVs)
Model 1
ARRA Funds Spent under the Block Grant
Types
Circumstance of State Energy Policy
ARRA Funds under the EERE
One-year lag
Two-year lag
Three-year lag
Government Financial Capacity
Federal DOE Expenditures
Non-Government Expenditures
Political Circumstance
Democratic Governor
Renewable Energy Circumstance
Establishment that Use RE in Electric
Power
Economic Characteristics
Per Capita Real GDP
Population Density
Under-identification Test p-value
Weak-identification Test (F-statistic)
Over-identification Test of instruments Test pvalue
Year FE
Observation

Coef.

Std. Err

P-value

0.730***

0.182

0.000

0.212*

0.127

0.095

0.946***
-0.135*
-0.197***

0.042
0.069
0.056

0.000
0.052
0.001

-0.000
-0.022

0.002
0.023

0.923
0.345

0.053

1.381

0.970

-1.80e+05

1.20e+05

0.136

0.000
0.000
0.000
27.625
0.141

0.388
0.141

-0.000
0.000

YES
539

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, p<0.01*** Dependent variable was total amount of ARRA expenditures spent
in seven grant programs under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.

Results
Table 10 presents the relevant descriptive statistics for the states, excluding D.C.
and Hawaii from 2005 to 2015. The number of job counted in energy efficiency sector
ranged from 61.74 to 19498.56 with a mean of 1983.172 and standard deviation of
2548.957. The number of job counted in renewable energy sector ranged from 10.98 to
7986.47 with a mean of 752.063 and standard deviation of 1050.341. The number of job,
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counted in combined sectors in energy efficiency and renewable energy, ranged from
72.72 to 27319.77 with a mean of 2735.235 and standard deviation 3579.751.
The ARRA funds spent in the seven grant programs administered by the EERE
ranged from $0 to $2,109,441,787 with an average of $1,851,895 over the period. Next
the amount of federal expenditures allocated annually by the DOE ranged from $258.824
to $42,601,587,316 with an average of $805,128,732 aggregated over the period of the
study. The total amount spent within state DOE programs through non-governmental
funding ranged from $0 to $3,405,072,313 with an average of $70,658,346 over the
period of the study.
In terms of political circumstances, 53.8% of the states had Democratic governor,
the influence of industries that use renewable energy resources in electric power
generation varied considerably, in the range of 0 to348, with a man of 30.15. Finally, in
regards to economic characteristics, per capita GDP ranged from $31.169 to $78,835 with
a mean of $49,579; population density ranged from 279.022 to22889.19 people per
square mile, with a mean of 5224.836. As instrumental variables, the amount of ARRA
funds spent in the CCDBG, CSBG, and CDBG ranged $0 to $674,560,200 with an
average of $15,514,690 over the period. In terms of circumstances of state energy
policies, the duration of the RPS and EERS ranged from 0 to 34 with a mean of 4.56
years.
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
The number of jobs counted in energy
efficiency sectors (1,000)
The number of jobs counted in renewable
energy sector (1,000)
The number of jobs counted in energy
efficiency and renewable energy sector
(1,000)
ARRA Funds ($10,000,000)
Federal DOE funds ($10,000,000)
Non-Federal Funds ($10,000,000)
Democratic Governor
Establishment that Use RE in Electric
Power
Per Capita Real GDP ($)
Population Density
ARRA Funds in Block Grants
($10,000,000)
Circumstance of State Energy Policy
Note: N = 539

Mean
1983.172

SD
2548.957

Min
61.74

Max
19498.56

752.063

1050.341

10.98

7986.47

2735.235

3579.751

72.72

27319.77

18.51895
80.512
7.065
0.538
30.153

36.16792
218.920
26.007
0.499
44.873

0
0.025
0
0
0

210.9442
4260.159
340.5072
1
348

49579.61
5224.836
1.551

9672.184
5432.428
5.298

31,169
279.022
0

78835.42
22889.19
67.456

4.560

6.419

0

34

Table 11 presented the results of the first difference model with instrumental
variables allowing fixed effects. In the results of the test of endogeneity, this research
presented the p value of the endogeneity test, these results indicate that the instrumental
variables lead to changes in the results. Null hypothesis, that ARRA funds spent in seven
intergovernmental grant programs are exogenous, were rejected at the all models, as the
p-value of the endogeneity test was 0.000. This research captures that state government
may be able to attract more ARRA funds if they have more experiences on energy
policies, or similar policy implementation tool. These measures helped correcting for the
ARRA funds’ effects. This research’s results have controlled all the omitted variables in
each model.
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Table 11 showed the results on the job creation for both individual years and the
cumulative effect. ARRA funds, spent in seven intergovernmental grant, had the positive
cumulative effect in job creation in energy efficiency sector (Model 1), renewable energy
sector (Model 2), and combined sectors (Model 3). In addition, all models showed the
importance of lagged ARRA funds’ effects. After two years, the ARRA funds had a
highly significant impact in job creation despite a negative impact occurred after one year
of the ARRA expenses.
As previously mentioned, states with more densely populated areas tended to have
more job related to energy efficiency and renewable energy. States with vibrant
economies were also tended to have more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable
energy sector.
At the second column for each model includes results assuming all variables are
exogenous. These results were similar to those from the main first difference models.
Also, in all of the statistical models, the year dummy variables for year specific effects
showed that more energy technologies were generated in 2009 and 2013 since the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was enacted in 2009. These results give us
evidence of the effectiveness of Federal stimulus package under the ARRA of 2009.10

10

Autocorrelation had been checked through the Durbin-Watson statistic and did not find any
problem in three different models.

70

Table 11. Job Creation in Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Sector
Model 1: EE
IV
exog
28.414*** 2.682***
ARRA Funds under
(4.630)
(0.973)
the EERE
-11.407***
One-year lag
-4.934***
(1.953)
(1.044)
Two-year lag
8.489***
4.133***
(2.312)
(1.417)
Three-year
25.406*** 25.030***
lag
(2.286)
(1.479)
Government Financial Capacity
Federal DOE
0.067
0.009
Expenditures
(0.067)
(0.042)
Non0.095
-0.394
Government
(0.720)
(0.463)
Expenditures
Political Circumstance
Democratic
-55.486
-22.339
Governor
(63.631)
(41.027)
Renewable Energy Circumstance
Establishment -1.51e+07 -9.28e+06
that Use RE
(1.08e+07) (6.96e+e6)
Economic Characteristics
Per Capita
0.040*
0.012
Real GDP
(0.022)
(0.013)
Population
1.598**
1.154***
Density
(0.678)
(0.436)
50.900***
26.911***
Cumulative Effects of
(5.214)
(2.099)
ARRA
Endogeneity Test P0.000
value
Observation
490
Country FE
Yes
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, p<0.01***

Model 2: RE
IV
exog
11.190***
1.299***
(1.946)
(0.456)
-2.586***
-0.098
(0.821)
(0.489)
3.240***
1.566**
(0.972)
(0.665)
12.010*** 11.865***
(0.961)
(0.694)

Model 3: EE and RE
IV
exog
39.604***
3.980***
(6.481)
(1.384)
-13.994***
-5.032***
(2.734)
(1.485)
11.728***
5.699***
(3.236)
(2.016)
37.415*** 36.896***
(3.200)
(2.104)

0.027
(0.028)
-0.034
(0.302)

0.005
(0.020)
-0.222
(0.217)

0.093
(0.093)
0.061
(1.008)

0.014
(0.061)
-0.615
(0.658)

-17.448
(26.756)

-4.706
(19.244)

-72.934
(89.070)

-27.046
(58.356)

-7.86e+06
(4.54e+07)

-5.64e+06*
(3.26e+06)

-2.29e+07
(1.51e+07)

-1.49e+07
(9.90e+06)

0.016*
(0.009)
0.735***
(0.285)
23.852***
(2.192)
0.000

0.005
(0.006)
0.565***
(0.204)
14.631***
(0.984)

0.056*
(0.030)
2.333***
(0.949)
74.753***
(7.299)
0.000

0.017
(0.019)
1.719***
(0.620)
41.542***
(2.986)

490
Yes
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490
Yes

Discussion
From energy security (Valentine, 2011) and mitigation of climate change
(Edenhofer et al., 2011; Liang & Fiorino, 2013) to boosting economic growth (Bowen et
al., 2013; Yi, 2013; Apergis & Payne, 2010) and employment (Lambert & Silva, 2012),
sustainable energy has been found to positively affect multiple aspects of our lives.
Federal, state, and local government has been offering numerous programs and financial
provisions to support and further encourage the production of renewable energy.
The ARRA of 2009 provided a wide array of policy instruments to stimulate the
US economy and establish a robust foundation for long-term economic growth. The clean
energy package played an important role in the ARRA job creation activities (Aldy,
2013). This research has focused that whether federal ARRA investments implemented
through intergovernmental grant programs, designed toward clean energy, lead to a spike
in job creation in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector at the state level.
This research has provided a new policy insight by investigating the effectiveness of the
temporary investment allocated through the ARRA, on creating jobs in energy-related
area.
Specifically, this research confirmed that cumulated ARRA expenditures
allocated through State Energy Office (SEO) from federal EERE led to higher level of
job creation in energy efficiency and renewable energy during the ARRA period.
Although the results showed that the ARRA spending had a negative impact in the shortterm (one-year after), these results had been matched the previous proposition that some
states encountered more difficulties to implement ARRA funds which raised several
intergovernmental challenges related to communication and administration (Carley &
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Hyman, 2014). Two years after, the ARRA funds led to positive impact on more job
creation. This research’s results support that job creation activities require some time. It
was strongly associated with delayed effects of government investment.
This research’s results also provide empirical confirmation that that temporary
government funding evidently played a determinative role in directly stimulating more
jobs in energy efficiency, renewable energy fields, despite the previous theoretical
scholarship that recognized only long-term governmental funding positively affecting
policy outcome. These positive impact of the temporary ARRA funding may be
impacted by the intergovernmental grant process. The intergovernmental grants funded
by the ARRA were designed to distribute funds to state or local governments so that they
could quickly spend on projects that would create jobs and foster growth in their
communities (Terman & Feiock, 2012). These empirical results showed that government
funds implemented under these intergovernmental grants process had positive impacts in
short term to stimulate employment in energy efficiency, and renewable energy sectors.
Also, it comes as no surprise that the number of jobs in energy efficiency (Model
1), renewable energy (Model 2), and combined sectors (Model 3) were directly related to
per capita gross state product. States with higher per capita gross state product are likely
to be more economically productive and prosperous, thus making job creation more
likely in energy efficiency and renewable energy sectors. Indeed, as we also expected,
this research’s empirical results confirmed that population density are positively
associated with energy efficiency and renewable energy relevant job. Empirical
evidences showed that more highly populated state with greater concentrations of human
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resources are more likely to have more jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable
energy sector.
Conclusions
The ARRA was the largest federal investment in U.S. history to support national
economic recovery during the Great Recession. It included explicate goals for stimulating
the job creation through investment in new energy technologies with respect to the
sustainable use of energy. This research tested whether the ARRA expenditures, that
were intended to stimulate the U.S. economy through establishing an innovative energy
technologies, achieve their goals. This research confirmed that cumulated ARRA
expenditure made in intergovernmental grant programs through the EERE led to higher
levels of job creation in energy efficiency, and renewable energy sectors.
At the same time, the ARRA funds, as one-shot grants, were intended to be
simulative, quickly spending of the money was important for achieving the goals in the
short term (Terman et al., 2016). Intergovernmental grant program was important tool to
stimulate that the ARRA funds were spent quickly. This research provides the empirical
results on the link between the ARRA funds implemented through the intergovernmental
grant program and its effects. These finding has implications that it is important to inject
a decentralization approach through intergovernmental grants regarding how government
expenditures can more efficiently promote for job stimulating.
Although one-shot federal spending may not be optimal for achieving longer term
impacts of job creation, the empirical evidence suggests that the short-term expenditures
led to effective performance in terms of job creation through investment in advanced
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energy technologies with respect to the sustainable use of energy, at least in the short
term and at the state level. From this viewpoint, future research should include empirical
study of whether government temporary investment might be important for achieving
longer-term job creation. Future studies are also needed investigation on the impact of
government expenditures implemented through the non-governmental contractors to
achieve national sustainable energy goals.
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CHAPTER IV
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION ACTIVITIES GENERATED DURING THE
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT: EVIDENCE FROM THE
ALTERNATVIE ENERGY PRODUCTION AND ENERGY CONSERVATION
(ESSAY 3)

Introduction
Technological change has been heavily influenced by changes in market demand
or by advances in science and technology (Nemet, 2009). Governments have employed
various strategies to promote the adoption of innovative energy technologies into the
technology-push (supply-side) and demand-pull (demand side). One of the most
commonly applied strategies to facilitate technology development is policy-directed
investment that subsidizes the cost of research and development (Siddiki et al., 2015).
President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
of 2009. It was to support national economic recovery during the Great Recession. It
included explicit goals for stimulating the economy through energy efficiency, energy
savings, and energy conservation with energy technologies (Carley, 2012). During the
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period of the ARRA, unprecedented investments were made to promote advanced,
efficient and clean energy in ways that contribute to reginal wealth creation. According
to the Act, some of the highlights of the ARRA funds, administered through the
Department of Energy (DOE), included the Advanced Research Project Agency’s Energy
program (ARPA-E) to support innovative energy technology. ARPA-E, within the
Department of Energy, supported energy technology research projects with the goal of
enhancing the nations’ economic and energy security.
To achieve these goals, the ARRA funds infused $275 billion in grant funds to
state and local governments, and another $224 billion for purposes such as enhanced
innovative technology systems (Conlan et al., 2017). Energy-related policy goals
stipulated in the rationales for these ARRA expenditures, over $36 billion was intended
specifically to catalyze innovation. These funds were allocated to academic institutions,
companies, research foundations, and industry research collaboration through state and
local government. These were focused largely on upgrading the energy technologies in
the areas of energy efficiency and renewable energy projects and programs.
Recent research has started to discuss the actual effects of the ARRA
expenditures. Some has looked at the impact of ARRA expenditures aimed at renewable
energy (RE) technologies on the job creation and environmental dimensions using
qualitative research (Toepler & Sommerfeld, 2017). Other has focused on assessment of
the ARRA expenditures in terms of helping to bring new technologies related to solar,
wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy sources at the national-level (Executive
Office of the President., 2016). The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) also evaluated
how well ARPA-E was achieving its goals and mission (National Academies of Sciences,
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2017). Still other research focused on assessment of the experiences of a range of
national actors during the ARRA period (Carley, 2016; Terman et al., 2016; Tonn et al.,
2016; Hall & Edward, 2011a; Hall & Edward, 2011b; Jennings et al., 2012). However,
although the literature provides sound reason to expect that the ARRA expenditures
substantially influenced innovation and development within the advanced energy sector,
no published research has yet examined empirically whether they effectively achieved
their stated objectives in regards specifically to technological energy innovation.
Accordingly, this research empirically evaluated the effectiveness of the ARRA funds
that tended to focus on the state and local ground-level aspects of grants aimed toward
technologies energy innovation. It focused specifically upon grant program designed for
purposes of stimulating innovation in the areas of alternative energy production and
energy conservation.
Theoretical Framework: Technological Innovation in Fiscal Decentralization
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) emphasis in
implementation shifted from ‘government’ to ‘networked governance’ in achieving
public goals (Conlan et al., 2017). ARRA funds were spent by state and local
governments. Each state government decided how to allocate its share of the funding to
local governments as well as others. State and local governments had fragmented and
independent authority to craft their actions to match their unique circumstances. The
grants from the ARRA funds did not change hierarchically-oriented federal-state-local
relationships. But they did stimulate collaboration between state and local governments
as well as federal and local governments.
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Specifically, the renewable energy and energy efficiency grant programs
implemented under the networked governance system included the State Energy Program
(SEP), Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG), Weatherization
Assistance Program Grant (WAP), and State Energy Efficient Appliance Rebate Program
(SEEARP). These grants were provided in Department of Energy’s Office of Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). In terms of the implementation of SEP,
EECBG, WAP, and SEEARP, all states were eligible to apply for direct formula grants
and competitive grants from federal DOE. Grants were allocated to state energy offices
through formula grants for projects and planning, and they were was allocated through
competitive grants to local entities. Each state decided how to award these sub-grants11.
The recipients of these grants were determined by the state governments, not the federal
government. The ARRA amount received by each state was sub-granted to units of local
government in the state that were not eligible for direct formula grant from federal DOE.
In other words, the states designed and carried out their own renewable energy and
energy efficiency programs. They were managed by state energy offices, not by the
federal DOE. The federal DOE provided administrative and institutional support, such as
the scope and goals of each energy program.
In particular, the application for the EECBG was strongly restricted depending on
the population. Cities were eligible for EECGB grants either directly from the federal
DOE or from the state in which they were located. A city with a population of at least

11

Goldman, C. A., Stuart, E., Hoffman, I., Fuller, M. C., & Billingsley, M. A. (2011). Interactions
Between Energy Efficiency Programs funded under the Recovery Act and Utility Customer-Funded Energy
Efficiency Programs. Lawrence Berkely National Laboratory.
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35,000 was eligible for a direct formula grant from federal DOE. A city with a population
below 35,000 was eligible for a sub-grant from the state energy offices. All cities were
eligible to apply for competitive grants from DOE regardless of population. The
recipients of competitive grants were smaller cities, and a recipient city was determined
by the state, not the federal government.
As part of the ARRA, DOE’s National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL),
on behalf of the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, provided funding
opportunities for Advanced Battery Manufacturing Grants12. Eligible applicants for this
grants were unrestricted. Grants under this program was awarded to meritorious projects
through a competitive process. Local governments, or non-government entities in each
state that were interested in applying for competitive grants, were eligible to make their
application. Also, Transportation Electrification Grants and Alternative-Field Vehicles
Grants were administered by the State Energy Office (SEO)13. State or local officials
made choices in how these grants programs would related to existing program. SEO had
responsibility to coordinate the development of projects and funds allocation14.
State and local governments, under the Department of Energy, designed their own
competitive programs and procedures and allocated the (cash) grants at their own
discretion. Some parts went directly to local agencies so that they could quickly be spent

12

Transportation Electrification Grant Program, National Energy Technology Laboratory, 16 Mar.
2009. Retrieved from https://www.netl.doe.gov/research/coal/carbon-storage/carbon-storageinfrastructure/arrasitechar
Retrieved from https://www.netl.doe.gov/File%20Library/Library/Environmental%20Assessments/12-2012-Signed-Chemetall-Foote-Silver-Peak-FONSI.pdf
13
Retrieved from https://www.arc.gov/funding/EnergyARRAGrantInformation.asp
14
Goldman, C. A., Stuart, E., Hoffman, I., Fuller, M. C., & Billingsley, M. A. (2011). Interactions
Between Energy Efficiency Programs funded under the Recovery Act and Utility Customer-Funded Energy
Efficiency Programs. Lawrence Berkely National Laboratory.
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on programs, projects and policies that would foster growth in their communities
(Terman & Feiock, 2014). Some of them were directly awarded to non-governmental
agencies.
In the perspective of how large amounts of ARRA funds were effectively
implemented, or not, recent studies have mentioned that the federal government relied on
existing state and local agencies to implement ARRA funds. The implementation process
offered very flexible aid to stimulate innovation at the state and local levels (Conlan et
al., 2017, p.5). ARRA’s design reflected tools of fiscal decentralization in federal
policies. The ARRA preferred a mixed program with state and local governments as well
as nonprofit, or private entities for purposes such as enhanced innovative technology
systems (Sissine, et al., 2009). Much of the Recovery Act’s funding was primarily
intended to help state and local governments finance their own policy goals.
In the related stream of public administration, previous research has also focused
on decentralized networks approaches in achieving national objectives. Specifically,
Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire (2011) remarked that the key to networked
government is that various actors, including public managers should have a role to play in
local, community-based initiatives. Goldsmith and Kettl (2009) have explored the role of
federal policymakers in effectively utilizing decentralized networks in federal policy
implementation. However, no studies have empirically tested the association between
financial resources allocated under the decentralized networks and innovation in energy
technologies.
Moreover, as is recognized by a growing body of literature, all of these
ideographic factors must be identified and systematically considered if one is to
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convincingly establish that decentralized networking has a positive impact on innovation
activities related to energy technologies at the state level. This study focused on the fiscal
decentralization framework and state governments who had autonomy in ARRA grant
allocation to serve their goals in the energy sector. A number of such factors have been
identified, as described in the following subsections.
Government Financial Capacity
Governments employ various strategies to reduce barriers to technology,
particularly where widespread adoption would align with broader policy goals. The U.S.
government has invested heavily in policies to support the development of innovative
energy technologies. A portion of this investment has been specifically targeted at
improving energy efficiency and renewable energy. In the past decade, scholars have
written that many technology innovation activities or strategies require large, consistent,
and long-term financial investments to encourage an uptake in technologies (Kalter &
Vogely, 1976). A rich theoretical body of scholarship has analyzed empirically the
relationship between the pattern of financial investment by governments and the variation
of energy technology innovations. Liang and Fiorino (2013) investigated the relationship
between policy stability in public resource allocation and policy outcomes in renewable
energy technologies from 1974 to 2009 at the national level. They found technology
innovation is affected by both the magnitude of federal research and development (R&D)
expenditures and the stability of government financial commitment. Margolis and
Kammen (1999) concluded that inadequate energy R&D spending and low R&D
intensity in the energy sector led to low levels of energy technology patenting activities.
Backstrom et al. (2014) demonstrated that large amounts of public R&D financial support
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had an important impact on solar photovoltaic (PV) innovations for 13 countries over the
time period 1978 to 2008. Most existing empirical studies have only focused on the
effects of the expenditure patterns of the federal government; they have criticized rapid
changes of funding levels and instability in funding trends in regard to the development
of technologies within the influence of the federal government’s expenditures.
Furthermore, most programs that supported technological innovation relied on
existing federal government mandating spending. At the same time, government has also
invited non-federal expenditures as mechanisms consists of voluntary collaborations that
are made between federal agencies and non-government donors in supporting mutual
initiatives. According to DOE’s strategic investment in science and technology, DOE
was inviting proposals funded by cooperative agreements, between government and
private industry (DOE, 2014). The projects related to the Clean Coal Power Initiative
and America’s Next Top Energy Innovator, as well as Energy Innovation Portal are
implemented through federal programs with non-governmental funding. Even though
these programs operate out of the federal government, their participation is never funded
by this government. In theoretical perspective, non-government funding’s participation,
provided by external entities like non-government organization, corporations or
foundations, is recognized as important strategies to expend their effectiveness into
broader trends associated with the energy policy innovation era (Carley, 2011; Conlan et
al., 2017). However, although it has been shown that the success of energy innovation
policies increasingly depend on cooperative activities (agreements) rather than the
expansion of power of the federal government, the effectiveness of the decentralized
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fiscal funds in the implementation stages of policy have not been investigated empirically
(Carley, 2011).
Therefore, this research separately considered each category of expenditure
allocated by the federal government and non-government sources on innovation activities
toward new energy technologies. Accordingly, this research hypothesized that state
governments with larger expenditures allocated by federal government are more likely to
have higher levels of innovation activities toward new energy technologies. Also, this
study expected that state governments with larger magnitudes of non-government
expenditures are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities toward new
energy technologies.
ARRA Funding
In 2008 and 2009, the United States was in the midst of the Great Recession,
possibly the worst economic situation the nation had faced since the Great Depression.
One of the first priorities of the new Obama administration was to implement policies and
programs to turn the economy around. In particular, one of the major economic initiatives
made by the Obama Administration was the implementation of the American Recovery
Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The ARRA provided a wide array of policy instruments to
stimulate the U.S. economy and establish a robust technological infrastructure for longterm economic growth (Aldy, 2013). In one important respect, the ARRA was designed
to emphasize ‘sustainable energy’ or ‘green energy.’ Depending on the definition of
‘green,’ these instruments tended to focus on technology innovation toward alternative
energy and energy conservation. Within the government’s ARRA investments, they
focused on economic activities that improve environmental quality through energy
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efficiency, savings and conservation utilizing energy technologies. Approximately $840
billion of the U.S. economy was spent on technological advancements, job creation, and
infrastructure development in the energy sector (Goldman et al., 2011). Specifically,
nearly 30 percent was allocated toward renewable energy generation. Approximately 22
percent was spent towards investments in energy efficiency. Also, 30 percent of budget
allocations were earmarked for increasing the reliability and sustainability of electricity
systems. The remaining investments were allocated toward vehicle and fuel
advancements, improved carbon capture, including storage, and clean energy
manufacturing.
Currently, the energy policy literature contains few analyses that explore the
effects or effectiveness of the new ARRA funds on the innovative energy technology
produced during the era of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. According to
the Executive Office of the President’s report (2016), the ARRA funding reached nearly
every aspect of the value chain, for numerous key clean energy technologies, including
advanced vehicles, batteries, carbon capture and sequestration, and technologies to
enhance energy efficiency. Also, the literature contains analyses of how ARRA
investments in the deployment of clean energy technologies helped contribute to dramatic
cost reductions for those same technologies, as part of a virtuous cycle. Mundaca and
Richter (2015) provided a comprehensive assessment of the impact of ARRA funding on
green technologies within resource-intensive approach. They suggested that stimulus
programs incentivizing research and development in the renewable energy sector led to
growth in the number of green energy technology patents issued by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 2009 to 2012. They suggested that growth
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regarding clean energy patents and green technology patents can be attributed to the
federal renewable stimulus program. In terms of the environmental dimensions of these
expenditures, the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Monthly Energy Review
analyzed their effects in terms of reductions in carbon dioxide emissions (EIA, 2013).
Emissions were allegedly reduced in 2012 due to ARRA’s impacts on technological
renewable energy deployment. Recently, the National Academies of Sciences (2017)
conducted an assessment and technical evaluation of ARPA-E under the ARRA. They
suggested that ARPA-E awardees, under the ARRA funds, produced patents and
scientific publications in greater numbers for various technologies. They concluded that
the flexible management approach should be preserved in technological advances.
However, most assessments on the relationship between ARRA expenditures and
its actual effects have focused on the general effects inferred from all federal ARRA
funds rather than expenditures specifically designed for energy. Empirical assessments
of specific programs intended to focus upon innovation in new energy technologies in the
body of relevant research are all anecdotal. Thus, in order to fill this gap, this research
addressed the actual effects of the innovation activities in energy technologies, vis-à-vis
federal ARRA expenditures intended to stimulate innovation in alternative energy and
energy conservation. Specifically, the effects of the ARRA expenditures allocated in
grant programs aimed to promote upgraded energy technologies under the Office of
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). Therefore, this research hypothesized
that state governments with greater ARRA expenditures allocated for innovation to
upgrade energy technologies are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities
toward new energy technologies.

86

Electricity Price
Previous studies have identified energy price as a determinant of levels of
innovation in alternative energy resource technologies. Several studies have empirically
tested the effects of energy prices on innovation in induced technologies. Popp (2002)
tested the effects of energy prices on energy efficiency innovation and found a strong
effect of energy price on energy efficient innovation, as measured by patent counts.
Popp, Newell and Jaffe (2009) explained that the direction of innovation likely responds
positively in the direction of increased relative prices. Johnstone et al (2009) investigated
the effects of both price-based and quantity-based policies on energy innovation from 25
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. They
found that an increase in the price of electricity is associated with increased incentives for
innovation and energy demand, which in turn create incentives for energy technology
innovation. Another study examined the effect of natural gas prices on renewable energy
technology development, and the statistical results confirmed that increased prices
increase levels of innovation (Kneifel et al., 2008).
Perhaps the most prominent view of researchers in this area is that advances in
electricity have allowed the implementation of many technological solutions that can be
impacted by the variations in energy consumption. Liang and Fiorino (2013) stated that
technological capacity can be associated with increased electricity prices. They
demonstrated how electricity prices were positively related to patent applications,
suggesting that a higher level of demand contributed to more innovation activities.
Johnstone, Hascic, and Popp (2010) also indicated that electricity market conditions have
had little effect on energy innovation. They explained the role of both electricity prices
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and growth in electricity consumption. Although one might expect more innovation in
alternative sources when prices are high and consumption is growing (thus signaling a
need for greater generation capacity), neither variable has had a statistically significant
effect on patents. Thus, this research expected to find that states with higher electricity
prices are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities toward new energy
technologies.
Structure of Electricity Market
Since the late 1990s, quite a few state governments in the United States have
relaxed the traditional regime of monopolistic regulation in electricity generating markets
to allow for the existence of competition. The adoption of electricity competition from
restructured deregulation had been expected to achieve lower energy costs, diversifying
energy supply options, ensuring a reliable, encouraging innovation in power supply
technologies, and affordable supply (Joskow, 2008). Previous research on the effects of
deregulated electricity markets have concluded that prices are higher in deregulated
market, but the changes in prices had been greater in the regulated markets (Ardoin &
Grady, 2006; Joskow, 2006). The effect of market competition on electricity rates is still
the subject of debated in some restructured states. However, with perspective of
generation technology, few studies have addressed that competition can foster
technological innovation activities. Competition in deregulated electricity markets enable
the electricity generating industry to invest innew and highly efficient generation capacity
(Joskow, 2006). In addition to the utility restructuring could accelerate new technological
innovation in the transmission and distribution grid, it could serve as more cost-effective
substitutes for transmission upgrades (Carley, 2009; Thomas et al., 2016). Therefore, this
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research expected to find that states with de-monopolized electricity markets are more
likely to have higher level of innovation activities in toward new energy technologies.
Knowledge Stock
It is generally argued that knowledge is one of the key factors for creating new
value. Some studies have attempted to evaluate the effect of variation in knowledge stock
on variation of innovation in upgraded energy resources. Many researchers have shown
that higher educational attainment was positively associated with the increase of
innovative technology in the United States (Yi, 2014; Yi, 2013; Inglehart & Abramson,
1994). Empirically, Simons and Choi (2009) demonstrated that more educated people can
better accept green energy technologies in the building sector. They added that more
highly educated individuals believe going green is the right thing to do. Internationally,
Hobmand and Ashworth (2013) confirmed that educational level was positive and
significant as an explanatory variable for the diffusion and development of technologies
related to renewable energy sources, within a sample of 1,907 Australians. Given these
considerations, I expected to find that states with greater knowledge stocks are positively
related to the growth of energy technology innovations. Therefore, this research expected
to find that states with higher knowledge stock are more likely to have higher level of
innovation activities toward new energy technologies.
Circumstances that Use Renewable Energy Sources
Following other local environmental policy research (Ong, 2012; Krause et al.,
2015), a greater presence of firms that use renewable energy is likely to have the effect
embedding green technologies for encouraging environmental actions. In other words,
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machines with new technologies may have been more likely to be owned by firms with a
higher propensity to switch technology toward renewable energy resources. The
variations of innovation in new energy technologies may thus be affected by the
expressed the willingness of previously existing firms to pay for greener products.
Therefore, this research expected that all else held equal, states in circumstances that use
more renewable energy resources in electric power generation are more likely to have
higher levels of innovation activities toward new energy technologies.
Circumstances of State-Energy Policies
State governments in the U.S. have adopted various clean, renewable, and
efficient energy policies to achieve sustainable energy objectives. State-level energy
policy initiatives have promoted the energy innovation in homes, business, industries,
electricity, and transportation sectors. States differ by existing energy policies
circumstances. Some states responded with minimal efforts towards energy policies,
other states have implemented energy programs actively to provide renewable and
efficiency energy resources. All states started renewable and energy efficiency policies in
different years. For example, 26 states had implemented the Energy Efficiency Resources
Standards (EERE) by 2016. Some of them, like California, started implementation in as
early as 2004. Also, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) that established requirements
for the adoption of renewable energy technologies in state electricity markets were
enacted in Nevada in 1997. Michigan enacted an RPS in 2008 (DSIRE, 2017). Longer
duration of relevant policies was indicative of more time for the planning and
implementation process as well as knowledge to influence on innovation in the area of
energy (Bowen et al., 2013). Therefore, this study expected that all else held equal, states
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with longer accumulated policies implementation experiences related to renewable and
energy efficiency are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities toward
new energy technologies.
Political Circumstances
It is generally argued that liberal political ideology is associated with green
energy policies and renewable energy programs (Yi & Feiock, 2012). The ideological
propensity of the governor and the legislators not only shape the support of green energy
laws (Coley & Hess, 2012), but also influence the innovative green energy technologies’
development and diffusion. As shown in the literature of policy termination, a stable and
predictable political environment is essential for the deployment and development of
green energy (DeLeon, 1983). Previous studies have analyzed the relationship between
states with a democratic governor and energy policy outcomes (Carley & NicholsonCrotty, 2015). Republican legislators tend to limit diffusion of the state green energy
policies (Coley & Hess, 2012). This is also consistent with recent efforts made by
Republican legislators in a dozen states to repeal the renewable portfolio standard (RPS).
Previous evidence also shows that Democratic governors are associated with a higher
likelihood of adopting environmental programs (Ringquist, 1993). Having a Democratic
governor could result in better green energy policy design, which could be more effective
in achieving the pre-design policy goals. Based on the above literature, the research focus
of this article was in examining the relationship between the political orientation of the
governor and policy outcomes for innovations in energy electrical technologies. This
research tested the effects of political circumstances, as it pertains to Democratic
governors and their effect on innovative activities new energy technologies, from 2005 to
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2015, in the United States. Thus, this study expected to find that states with a more
legislature seats occupied by Democrats are more likely to have higher levels of
innovation activities in new energy technologies, when compared to states with a
Republican governor.
Economic Characteristics
Following previous studies, state-specific economic characteristics are always
relevant in the growth of innovative technology. The first such factor is the overall level
of state economic activities, as characterized by greater per capita gross domestic product
(GDP). A recent study found that the higher a state’s per capita GDP, the larger the
market size in the state, which creates a sufficiently large market to achieve economies of
scale for innovative technology and for related industries to develop and grow (Yi, 2013).
Porter and Stern (2001) showed a positive relationship between innovative capacity and
per capita GDP, which was a main determinant for patterns of technological performance.
Thus, this study expected to find that states with vibrant economies are more likely to
have higher level of innovation activities toward new energy activities.
Secondly, in the literature on the relationship between population and technology
development, previous evidence has shown that greater population stimulates
technological change because it increases the number of potential inventors (Kremer,
1993). Previously published empirical research also demonstrated that greater population
sizes tend to present more opportunities for developing new technologies. They argued
that if a state has a larger population it may have a greater chance of creating new
innovative technologies (Sadorsky, 2013). More highly populated states with greater
concentrations of human resources also tend to have a correspondingly higher likelihood
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of creating new technologies (Madlener & Sunak, 2011). This study expected to find that
states with larger populations are more likely to have higher level of innovation activities
toward new energy technologies.
Research Methods
Conceptual Model
The major purpose of this research was to evaluate the effectiveness of the ARRA
funds on innovative activities in energy technologies. The focus was upon the
intergovernmental grants allocated for state and local governments through the Office of
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy of the DOE, since they were where the funds
were dispersed. Under the ARRA funds, each program design, on the intergovernmental
grants, was heterogeneous across states. The different program designs across states may
lead to variation in outcomes. Thus, this study focused on state level analysis. This
research included years both before and after ARRA from 2005 to 2015 to observe the
impact of the ARRA funds. The analysis was directed toward whether these one-time
shot ARRA grants led to a spike in innovation activities and whether it has had any longterm impact. All of the previously mentioned factors had to be statistically considered.
This study used a first differenced analysis with instrumental variables to consider
the endogeneity of the ARRA funds. This was accomplished using a first-differenced
two-stage least squares (FD2SLS) estimation routine. The idea was to control
correlations between lagged ARRA variables and the modeling error term. This was done
allowing for fixed effects.
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The analysis was limited to 49 states and excluded Hawaii and Washington D.C15.
The analysis assumed an underlying process with two stages. The first stage generated
whether or not the ARRA funds (endogenous variable) were associated with instrumental
variables and the second generated the model that captured the two effects including the
direct effect from the explanatory variables, and the proxy effect from the omitted
variables:
′
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡 + 𝜋2 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜋3 𝑋𝑠𝑡
+ 𝜋4 ∗ 𝑇+ 𝜋5 ∗ 𝑆 + 𝜗𝑠𝑡

(1)
′
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑠(𝑡−𝑖) + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆 + 𝜗𝑠𝑡

(2)

In the first stage equation (1), 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠𝑡 represents the total amount of
federal ARRA expenditures allocated in seven grant programs (See Table 14) under the
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) by the Department of
Energy, under the ARRA, in state s, and individual year 𝑡. This research included two
instrumental variables that did not statistically relate to energy technologies’ innovation
or promotion, but were correlated with the level of the allocated ARRA funds. As
instrumental variables, this study used the 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 which means the
unemployment rates in state s, and individual year 𝑡, and the 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡 which means
the amount of ARRA funds spent under the non-energy block grant program in state s,
and individual year 𝑡. I expected that two instrumental variables are highly correlated
with the 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠𝑡 which means total amount of ARRA expenditures allocated in

15

There are no complete data sets on energy expenses and policies for the state of Hawaii;
Washington DC is excluded because the analysis is limited to states.
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seven grant programs for promoting energy innovation activities under the decentralized
networks.
In the second stage equation (2), 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is the total number of patent
applications at individual level counted in the classification identified in the Alternative
Energy Production and the Energy Conservation of the Green Technology Classification
within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)’ Green Technology Pilot Program
in state s and year t. In all equations, 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑠(𝑡−𝑖) represents the total amount of
federal ARRA expenditures allocated in seven grant programs under the EERE, under the
ARRA, in state s, and individual year 𝑡 with lag length of i. This captured the lagged
effects of the total amount spent by EERE under the ARRA. The lag length of i was used
from one year to three years. The appropriate lag length was determined by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) (Popp, 2016). Where 𝑋′𝑠𝑡 was a vector of independent
variables including financial capacity, electricity price, structure of electricity market,
knowledge stock, and influence of industries that use renewable sources, circumstances
of state-energy policies, political circumstances and economic circumstances in state s
and year t.

was error term into identically distributed state-effect term.

Data
Dependent variable
The dependent variable reflected the total number of patent applications in
classification identified in the Alternative Energy Production and the Energy
Conservation of the Green Technology within the USPTO’s Green Technology Pilot
Program. The Classification of Green Technology was used to isolate alternative energy
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(Model 1), energy conservation (Model 2) and combined categories (Model 3) regarding
the labeling of patent applications. These particular classifications were used in order to
take into account the impact of the ARRA funds on innovation activities related to
alternative energy and energy conservation. The count of patent application was used as
proxy for innovative activities instead of patent publication, which would have reflected
innovation output. Although patent applications may not translate into practice, their
counts have the potential for most accurately representing the outcomes for technological
innovative activities (Johnstone et al., 2009). Relevant patent applications were counted
in the data at the individual patent level, with using codes issued by the USPTO’s Green
Technology Pilot Program. The concept of the Green Technologies covers a broad range
of fundamentally different types of innovation including 1) Alternative Energy
Production 2) Energy Conservation 3) Environmentally Friendly Faming 4)
Environmental Purification, Protection, or Remediation (See Table 12).

Table 12. Classification of the Green Technology
Classification of the Green Technology under Green Technology Piot Program
1
Alternative Energy Production
2
Energy Conservation
3
Environmentally Friendly Farming
4
Environmental Purification, Protection, or Remediation
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office. USPTO Green Technology Pilot Program, Retrieved from
http://www.waybetterpatents.com/green_tech_pilot_program.html

This research was focused on innovative activities of the energy technologies to
improve energy conservation, and develop alternative sources of energy. This idea was to
examine the effectiveness of the ARRA funds’ in terms of their rationales regarding
developing advanced energy as part of the larger U.S. energy policy. Thus, the dependent
variable contained observations only for the number of patent applications in Alternative
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Energy Production and Energy Conservation classifications (See Appendix A and
Appendix B). The number of patent applications included in the definition of Alternative
Energy Production and the Energy Conservation were derived from the Public PAIR
dataset provided by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).16
Independent variables
The empirical model included factors that, on the basis of previous research,
could be expected to influence levels of innovation activities in the energy technology
field. See Table 13 for a description and the source of each of the independent variables.
These include (1) ARRA expenditure, (2) financial capacity, (3) electricity prices, (4)
structure of electricity market, (5) knowledge stock, (6) circumstances that use renewable
energy sources, (7) circumstances of state-energy policies, (8) political circumstances,
and (9) economic characteristics

16

The data are available at (https://pairbulkdata.uspto.gov/).
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Table 13. Variable Measurements
Variables
Dependent variable
Innovation Activities in
Energy Technologies

Independent variable
ARRA Funds

Financial Capacity

Electricity Price

Structure
of Electricity Market
Knowledge Stock
Circumstances that Use
RE Sources
Circumstances of StateEnergy Policies
Political Circumstance

Economic
Characteristics
Per Capita
GDP
Population
Instrumental Variable
ARRA Funds
in Block Grant
Unemployment
Rate

Measurements
1) Total number of patent applications
counted in the Alternative Energy
Production (Model 1)
2) Total number of patent applications
counted in the Energy Conservation
(Model 2)
3) Total number of patent applications (at
individual level) counted in the
classification identified in 1) Alternative
Energy Production and 2) Energy
Conservation of the Green Technology
Classification (Model 3)
Total amount of federal ARRA expenditures
spent in 7 grant programs under the Office of
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
(EERE), the lag length was used from one
year to three years.
1) Total amount of federal expenditures
annually allocated by the Department of
Energy
2) Total amount spent under the federal
DOE program through non-government
funding participation
State’s average annual retail electricity price
in residential, and industrial sectors
(cents/KWH)
The presence of de-monopolized electricity
market (1= presence, 0=otherwise)
Percentage of population over the age of 25
with BA or higher
Number of establishments that use renewable
energy resources (See Appendix C)
Duration of policy on the RPS, EERS, and
EERPB
1) Percentage of House seats occupied by
Democrat at state level
2) Percentage of Senate seats occupied by
Democrat at the state level

1) Per Capita Real GDP adjusted in 2015
dollars
2) Number of whole population (1,000)
8) Total amount of federal ARRA
expenditures spent under the CCDBG,
CSBG and CDBG
9) Number of percentage of unemployed
from the sum of the employed and
unemployed.
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Data Source

United States Patent
and Trademark
Office(USPTO)’s
Public PAIR Dataset

Department of Energy
Data Reported by the
American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act
(www.recovery.gov)

USASPENDING.
GOV
(www.usasspending.gov)

U.S. Energy
Information
Administration (EIA)
EIA
U.S. Census Bureau
U.S. Census Bureau
DSIRE
Multistate Associates
Incorporated (MAI)

Bureau of Economic
Analysis
(BEA)

Data Reported by the
American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act
(www.recovery.gov),
Bureau of Labor
Statistics
(https://www.bls.gov/)

This study used federal government ARRA expenditures invested for motivating
innovation of energy technologies. The variable contained observations of the total
amount spent in seven grant programs aimed to promote upgraded energy technologies
under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) (See Table 14).

Table 14. Fiscal Decentralization Tools in the ARRA: Intergovernmental Grants
DOE Office

Grant Provision
1) Energy Efficiency and Conservation
Block Grants

Grant Purpose
Grant for supporting energy conservation
in the transportation, building, and other
sectors and renewable energy
development
2) Weatherization Assistance Grant
Grant for purchase of the energy efficient
Program
equipment for low income household
Office of
3) State Energy Grant Program
Grant for state-led energy initiatives. It
Energy
was aimed to promote the energy
Efficiency
efficiency and energy conservation.
and
4) State Energy Efficient Appliance Rebate Grant for the purchase of energyRenewable
Grant
efficiency Energy Star products
Energy
5) Advanced Battery Manufacturing Grants Grant for developing advanced battery
(EERE)
and battery system
6) Transportation Electrification Grants
Grant for conducting demonstration
(evaluation) on advanced electric drive
vehicles technologies.
7) Alternative-Fueled Vehicles Grants
Grant for the purchase of alternative fuel
and advance technology vehicles
Source: Energy Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Retrieved from
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R40412.pdf

The overarching hypotheses was that the ARRA expenditures spent in
intergovernmental grant programs and intended to support the energy technologies would
be associated with increases in innovative activities in energy technologies. Indeed, this
research employed ARRA expenditure’s lagged variables with length of three years to
address the short-run and long-run effects of ARRA expenditures. It was represented in
terms of the cumulative effects of the ARRA expenditures for the past three years. The
database related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds was
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collected from Department of Energy Data Reported by the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (www.recovery.gov).
This research also included other explanatory variables: financial capacity,
electricity circumstances, knowledge stock, circumstances that use renewable energy
sources, circumstances of state-energy policies, political circumstance, and economic
characteristics. The financial capacity of government was indicated by two types of
annual expenditures by the federal government and non-government sources: (1) the total
amount of federal expenditures allocated annually by the Department of Energy (DOE);
and (2) the total amount of expenditures came from non-government sources. Federal
DOE expenditure has been obligated annually under a rationale about stimulating
innovative activities toward the sustainable energy resources (Executive Office of the
President, 2016). It was implemented as a mandatory spending regimen over the long
time regardless of enacting of Recovery Act funds. In this regard, this expenditures could
be characterized as stable, and predictable funds of government. In the other hand, total
amount from non-government resources was collected from total amount implemented
within federal DOE program with non-government funding participation. Nongovernment expenditures were made based upon temporal contracts with provision of
funds from the non-government sector over the short term. These expenditures can be
characterized as non-stable, unpredictable investments (Nemet & Kamman, 2007). To
determine determinants of innovation activities in energy technologies, these two
different categories of expenditures were used to proxy for government financial capacity
because there is reason to expect that they would lead to increases in innovation activities
toward new energy technologies. The analysis assumed each effectiveness between
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federal expenditure and non-government expenditures. The related data are gathered from
an online database, USAspending.gov (www.usaspending.gov)17.
Previous research has shown that the determinants of innovative activity in energy
technologies broadly include electricity circumstances. Thus, more specifically,
electricity circumstances were observed with two attributes. Firstly, the states’ average
annual electricity price in the residential and industrial sector was applied. This reflected
the average annual retail electricity price. The data were collected by form EIA-861,
which is the Annual Electric Power Industry Report of the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) at the state level. Each observation was measured annually over
the period of 2005 to 2015, and the units used were cents/kilowatt-hour. All values were
adjusted to 2015 values. Secondly, the analysis assumed that competition in electricity
market may lead to more technological innovation related to energy. In order to account
for the electricity circumstance, this research used a variable reflecting the electricity
market structure. Structure of electricity market was categorized within two groups: (1)
group included both states with monopolized electricity market and states with suspended
de-monopolized electricity market even if electricity restructuring law was enacted; (2)
group included only states with de-monopolized electricity market. States with the form
of de-monopolized electricity market were coded ‘1’, States with the form of
monopolized electricity market were coded ‘0’. States with suspended de-monopolized
electricity market were also coded ‘0’.

17

www.usaspending.gov is established based on the Federal Funding Accountability and
Transparency Act (FFATA) of 2006. Usaspending.gov is the most comprehensive database on government
expenditures.
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The analysis assumed that the size of a state’s higher knowledge stock would
influence its level of innovation activities. To measure the knowledge stock, this study
used an indicator of educational attainment. The proportion of 25 year olds and older
with at least a bachelor’s degree was applied. Educational attainment data is available in
the annual Current Population Survey at U.S. Census of Governments
(https://www.census.gov/govs/).
In addition, this study expected that states with circumstances in which they used
more renewable energy resources are more likely to have higher levels of innovation
activities in energy technologies. The model included the number of establishments that
used renewable energy resources in the electric power generation industries. The
industries that use wind, geothermal, biomass, and solar electric power generation were
defined by the Economic Census under the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS). This was recorded at the six digit NAICS level within six subcategories (See Appendix C); (1) Hydroelectric power generation (NACIS 221111), (2)
Solar electric power generation (NACIS 221114), (3) Wind industries (NACIS 221115),
(4) Geothermal (NACIS 221116), (5) Biomass (NACIS 221117). Data was retrieved
from the Census Bureau Economic.
Furthermore, this research expected that states with longer accumulated
experience with policy implementation related to renewable and energy efficiency would
be more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities in energy technologies. The
model included three of the most important state-energy policies: Renewable Energy
Portfolio Standards (RPS), Energy Efficiency Resources Standards (EERS) and Energy
Efficiency Requirements for Public Buildings (EERPB). I included the difference
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between the current year and the year of adoption. Data was retrieved from the Database
of State Incentives for Renewable & Efficiency (DSIRE).
Next, previous research has shown that the presence of a political orientation of
the Democratic are more likely to support to green technologies that are associated with
the effect on the quality of the environment (Clark & Whitfor, 2011; Krause et al., 2014).
Therefore, I expected states with higher percentages of House and Senate seats occupied
by Democrats were more likely to have higher levels of technological innovation related
to the energy. The independent variable related to political circumstances was measured
in terms of percentages of House and Senate seats occupied by Democrats.
Finally, this study specifically used state economic characteristics, including the
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and population. All relevant numbers were
adjusted for inflation and listed in 2015 dollars using the GDP deflator.
Instrumental variables
The first instrumental variable was the unemployment rate. ARRA was intended
to stimulate growth in economic performance and employment. Unemployment rates can
be correlated with the level of ARRA funds allocated at the state level. However,
unemployment rates are not directly related to innovation activities that foster new energy
technologies. This research assumed that states with high unemployment rates would
have spent more ARRA dollars to create more jobs.
The second instrumental variable was the total amount of federal ARRA funds
spent in block grant programs aimed to provide federal grants to state or local
governments. Under the ARRA, block grant programs were designed to stimulate
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innovation at the state and local levels (Conlan et al., 2017). The ARRA funding, through
the block grant programs, increased rapidly over the time period of the ARRA (Dilger &
Boyd, 2014). State and local governments received $52.9 billion in the form of grant-inaid funds under the ARRA (Conlan et al., 2017, p.33). This funding was intended to
reform federalism relationships as well as to reduce bureaucratic redundancy and cost
(Terman & Feiock, 2014). What this research proposes is that the funding of the ARRA
block grants was analogous to that of ARRA energy grants implemented through the
EERE. Governments tend to pursue similar reforms (Urpelainem & Yang, 2017);
therefore, when the ARRA energy funds were allocated under the decentralized
framework for simulating energy innovation, they were so allocated as to mirror the
funding of the block grants. Finally, also included in the second instrumental variable
was the total amount spent under the Child Care and Development Block Grant
(CCDBG) program18, the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG)19 program and
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program.20
For the instrument to be valid, I confirmed that the total amount of ARRA
expenditures spent in the form of block grants, through the CCDBG, CSBG and CDBG,
were highly correlated with the total amount of ARRA expenditures allocated within the
decentralized networks under the DOE’s Office of EERE and Office, but not directly
related to outcome of the innovation activities in energy technologies. The rate of
unemployment was also correlated with the total amount of ARRA expenditures spent for

The program’s purpose was to provide for child care assistance for low-income families, it was
implemented under the Department of Health and Human Services.
19
The program’s purpose was to help to alleviate the causes and conditions of poverty in
communities, it was implemented under the Department of Health and Human Services.
20
The program’s purpose was to provide community development for affordable housing and antipoverty, it was implemented under the Department of Housing.
18
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energy innovation (See Appendix E). According to the results of the first stage with the
instrumental variables, there was a strong positive association between the ARRA funds
spent in the form of block grant and ARRA funds spent for energy technologies
innovation within the decentralized networks. When ARRA energy funds were spent for
energy innovation, there was a significant difference between states with higher rates of
unemployment and those with lower rates of unemployment. Those states with higher
unemployment had higher rates of ARRA funding for energy innovation. Thus, this
research discovered that the potential drivers behind ARRA energy investment were the
amount of ARRA funds spent in the form of block grants and the rate of unemployment.
In order to suggest validity of the instrumental variables, the week identification
test was used based on the F-statistic (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The results of this test
showed that the instrumental variables were strong. The F-statistic for the first-stage
regression analysis was consistently much larger than 10 (Table 15). A test of
overidentifying restrictions was performed in order to verify the validity of instrumental
variables. The null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are valid was not rejected.
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Table 15. First-Stage Results with Instrumental Variables (IVs)
Model 1
ARRA Funds Spent under the Block Grant Types
Unemployment Rate
ARRA Funds under the EERE
One-year lag
Two-year lag
Three-year lag
Financial Capacity
Federal DOE Expenditures
Non-Government Expenditures
Electricity Price
Electricity Price in Residential Sector
Electricity Price in Industrial Sector

Coef.

Std. Err

P-value

0.713***
1.554***

0.178
0.571

0.000
0.007

0.860***
-0.128*
-0.246***

0.042
0.066
0.055

0.000
0.055
0.000

0.000
-0.022

0.002
0.022

0.945
0.314

0.892
-1.231*
-0.058
0.098
1.56e+04

0.643
0.684
1.634
0.150
1.28e+05

0.166
0.073
0.972
0.515
0.903

De-Monopolized Electricity Market
Knowledge Stock
Circumstances that Use RE Sources
Circumstances of State-Energy Policies
RPS
0.190
0.164
0.248
EERS
0.199
0.385
0.605
EERPB
-0.577
0.402
0.153
Political Circumstance
%House Seats occupied by Democrats
0.051
0.092
0.583
% Senates occupied by Democrats
-0.107
0.080
0.183
Economic Characteristics
Per Capita Real GDP
0.000
0.000
0.593
Population (1,000)
0.001***
0.000
0.000
Under-identification Test p-value
0.000
Weak-identification Test (F-statistic)
32.102
Over-identification Test of instruments Test p-value
0.297
Year FE
YES
Observation
539
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, p<0.01*** Dependent variable was total amount of ARRA expenditures spent
in seven grant programs under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.
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Results
Table 16 presents the relevant descriptive statistics for the states, excluding D.C.
and Hawaii from 2005 to 2015. The number of patent applications combined in the
Alternative Energy Production and the Energy Conservation ranged from 0 to 5535 with
a mean of 200.063 and standard deviation of 494.352. The number of patent applications
in the Alternative Energy Production ranged from 0 to 2184 with a mean of 82.033 and
standard deviation of 239.755. The number of patent applications in Energy Conservation
ranged from 0 to 3351 with a mean of 118.029 and standard deviation of 276.347. The
ARRA grants spent in the seven grant programs administered by the Office of Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) ranged from $0 to $2,109,441,787 with an
average of $1,851,895 over the period. Next, the amount of federal expenditures allocated
annually by the Department of Energy (DOE) ranged from $258,824 to $42,601,587,316
with an average of $805,128,732 aggregated over the period of the study. The total
amount spent within state DOE programs through non-governmental funding ranged
from $0 to $3,405,072,313 with an average of $70,658,346 over the period of the study.
In terms of electricity price, states’ average annual retail electricity price in the
residential sector ranged from 6.21 cent/kwh to 20.94cent/kwh with an average of 11.353
cent/kwh. States’ average annual retail electricity price in the industrial sector ranged
from 3.60 cent/kwh to 16.82 cent/kwh with an average of 7.17 cent/kwh. Also, 29% of
the states had a de-monopolized electricity market. The percentage of the state’s
population over age 25 with a BA degree or higher ranged from 15% to 40%, with a
mean of 27.44%. The influence of industries that use renewable energy resources in
electric power generation varied considerably, in the range of 0 to 348, with a mean of
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30.15. In terms of circumstances of State-energy policies, the duration of the Renewable
Portfolio Standards policy ranged from 0 to 19 with a mean of 3.363 year. The duration
of Energy Efficiency Resource Standard policy ranged from 0 to14 with a mean of 1.196
years, the duration of policy on Energy Efficiency Requirements for Public Buildings
ranged from 0 to 12 with mean of 1.948 years. In regards to political support
circumstances, the percentage of House seats occupied by Democrats ranged from 13%
to 92% and the percentage of Senate seats occupied by Democrats from 7% to 96%, both
with means of close to 50%. Finally, in regards to economic characteristics, per capita
GDP ranged from $$31,169 to $78,835 with a mean of $49,579; and population ranged
from 514,157 to 39,288,180 with a mean of 6,273,252. As instrumental variables, the
amount of ARRA grants spent through the CCDBG, CSBG, and CDBG ranged $0 to
$674,560,200 with an average of $15,514,690 over the period. The rate of unemployment
ranged from 2.4% to 13.7% with an average of 6.3%.
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Table 16. Descriptive Statistics
Innovation
Activities

ARRA Funds

Financial Capacity

Electricity Price

Structure of
Electricity Market
Knowledge Stock
Circumstances that
Use RE Sources
Circumstances of
State-Energy
Policies
Political
Circumstances
Economic
Characteristics
ARRA Funds in
Block Grants

Unemployment
Rate

Variable
Patent Applications counted in
Alternative Energy Production
and Energy Conservation
Patent Applications counted in
Alternative Energy Production
Patent Applications counted in
Energy Conservation
Total amount of federal ARRA
expenditures spent in 7 grant
programs under the Office of
Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy (EERE)
($10,000,000)

Mean
200.063

SD
494.352

Min
0

Max
5535

82.033

239.755

0

2184

118.029

276.347

0

3351

18.518

36.167

0

210.9442

Federal Expenditures allocated
by the DOE ($10,000,000)
Total amount spent under the
federal DOE program through
non-government funding
participation ($10,000,000)
Electricity Price in Residential
Sector (cents/kwh)
Electricity Price in Industrial
Sector (cents/kwh)
Status of De-Monopolized
Electricity Market
Percentage of BA or higher
Number of establishments that
use renewable energy resources
Duration of RPS
Duration of EERS
Duration of EERPB
% House occupied by Democrats
% Senates occupied by
Democrats
Per Capita Real GDP ($)
Number of Population (1,000)
Total amount of federal ARRA
expenditures spent under the
CCDBG, CSBG and CDBG
($10,000,000)
Number of percentage of
unemployed from the sum of the
employed and unemployed.

80.512

218.920

0.025

4260.159

7.065

26.007

0

340.5072

11.353

3.032

6.21

20.94

7.175

2.540

3.6

16.82

0.293

0.455

0

1

27.440
30.153

4.963
44.873

15.1
0

40.4
348

3.363
1.196
1.948
48.399
47.251

5.039
2.457
2.636
17.371
18.755

0
0
0
13.333
7.096

19
14
12
92
96.65

49579.61
6273.252
1.551

9672.184
6862.072
5.298

31169
514.157
0

78835.42
39288.18

6.318

2.168

2.4

13.7

Note: N = 539
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67.456

Table 17 presented the results of the first difference model with instrumental
variables allowing fixed effects. In the results of the test of endogeneity, this research
presented the p-value of the endogeneity test, these results indicate that the error term in
each model did not correlate with the ARRA funds. (Woolridge, 2003; Popp, 2016).
Table 17 presents the highly significant results of Model 2 (energy conservation)
and Model 3 (alternative energy production and energy conservation) after an individual
year of the ARRA funding. After a three-year period of ARRA expenses, these figures
increased significantly, thereby suggesting the effectiveness of such funding. However, a
negative impact occurred after two years because innovation does require a long time
period for implementation. Thus, this research showed that innovative activities in energy
technologies do bear fruit, but over time.
Table 17 also presented Model 1 (alternative energy production) as a weak trend
toward significant in the first individual year; however, after three years, the ARRA
funds had a highly significant impact, signaling that time is required for alternative
energy production.
In the results of first differenced models, the ARRA funds had the largest
cumulative effects on the innovative activities in the technologies of the alternative
energy and the energy conservation, as well as combined categories, over the period of
the ARRA. These results indicate that ten million dollars of additional government
ARRA funds led to development in slightly more than 815,993 new energy technologies
over five years.
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In addition, in Table 17, the second column for each model includes results
assuming all variables are exogenous. These results were similar to those from the main
first difference models. Also, in all of the statistical models, the year dummy variables for
year specific effects showed that more energy technologies were generated in 2009 and
2013 since the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was enacted in 2009. These
results give us evidence of the effectiveness of Federal stimulus package under the
ARRA of 2009.21

21

Autocorrelation had been checked through the Durbin-Watson statistic and did not find any
problem in three different models.
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Table 17. Determinants of the Innovative Activities in Energy Technologies

IV

Model 1
exog

ARRA Funds under the EERE
Individual year
1.428*
0.305
(0.777)
(0.275)
One-year lag
1.213***
1.492***
(0.343)
(0.295)
Two-year lag
0.284
0.099
(0.421)
(0.408)
Three-year lag
1.685***
1.667***
(0.419)
(0.424)
Financial Capacity
Federal DOE
0.002
-0.001
Expenditures
(0.012)
(0.012)
Non-Government
-0.043
-0.067
Expenditures
(0.130)
(0.131)
Electricity Price
Electricity Price in
-7.194
-5.181
Residential Sector
(11.498)
(11.558)
Electricity Price in
-1.419
-4.460
Industrial Sector
(11.586)
(11.551)
-12.072
-12.496
De-Monopolized
(10.762)
(10.885)
Electricity Market
-1.492
-1.408
Knowledge Stock
(0.978)
(0.988)
1.46e+05
4.20e+05
Circumstances that Use
(1.98e+06)
(1.99e+06)
RE Sources
Circumstances of State-Energy Policies
RPS
3.886
5.135
(11.630)
(11.739)
EERS
-8.340
-10.224
(13.569)
(13.673)
EERPB
5.544
5.882
(12.858)
(13.007)
Political Circumstance
%House Seats by
-0.322
-0.247
Democrats
(1.187)
(1.200)
% Senates by
-0.005
-0.117
Democrats
(0.980)
(0.989)
Economic Characteristics
Per Capita Real
0.000
-0.001
GDP
(0.003)
(0.003)
Population (1,000)
-0.036
-0.033
(0.056)
(0.056)
4.609***
3.562***
Cumulative Effects of
(0.907)
(0.608)
ARRA
Endogeneity Test P-Value 0.1477
Observation
490
Country FE
Yes
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, p<0.01*
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IV

Model 2
exog

IV

Model 3
exog

2.532***
(0.928)
1.114***
(0.410)
-2.849***
(0.502)
6.849***
(0.500)

3.009***
(0.333)
0.995***
(0.358)
-2.770***
(0.495)
6.856***
(0.514)

3.960***
(1.480)
2.326***
(0.654)
-2.565***
(0.801)
8.534***
(0.798)

3.314***
(0.532)
2.487***
(0.571)
-2.671***
(0.490)
8.524***
(0.820)

0.009
(0.014)
-0.268*
(0.156)

0.010
(0.014)
-0.258
(0.159)

0.011
(0.023)
-0.311
(0.249)

0.010
(0.023)
-0.325
(0.254)

13.701
(13.726)
-5.400
(13.831)
-19.782
(12.848)
0.594
(1.168)

12.846
(14.014)
-4.108
(14.005)
-19.602
(13.198)
0.558
(1.19)

6.507
(21.893)
-6.819
(22.060)
-31.854
(20.491)
-0.899
(1.863)

7.664
(22.365)
-8.568
(22.351)
-32.098
(21.063)
-0.850
(1.913)

1.37e+06
(2.36e+06)

1.25e+05
(2.42e+06)

1.51e+06
(3.77e+06)

1.67e+06
(3.86e+06 )

3.640
(13.884)
-19.161
(16.199)
5.787
(15.350)

3.109
(14.233)
-18.360
(16.578)
5.644
(15.771)

7.526
(22.145)
-27.501
(25.837)
11.331
(24.482)

8.244
(22.715)
-28.585
(26.458)
11.244
(25.169)

-1.870
(1.417)
0.264
(1.170)

-1.902
(1.455)
0.312
(1.199)

-2.192
(2.261)
0.259
(1.867)

-2.149
(2.323)
0.195
(1.914)

-0.002
(0.004)
-0.017
(0.067)
7.645***
(0.848)
0.1842

-0.002
(0.004)
-0.018
(0.068)
8.090***
(0.738)

-0.002
(0.007)
-0.053
(0.107)

-0.002
(0.007)
-0.051
(0.110)
11.653***
(1.177)

490
Yes

12.255***

(1.727)
0.1574

490
Yes

Discussion
During 2008 and 2009 recession, the Obama administration used ARRA funds for
macroeconomic purposes of helping to recover from the recession. A substantial amount
of expenditure occurred at the state level, and was designed to stimulate green growth,
create jobs and support energy technologies (Conlan et al., 2017). This research has
focused that whether federal ARRA investments, designed to spur new technologies,
toward alternative energy and energy conservation, effectively achieved their stated
objectives. Specifically, the third essay focused on the evaluation of the cumulative
effects of government ARRA funding as well as year by year spending. This research
confirmed that cumulated ARRA expenditures made in grants through the Office of
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) led to higher levels of innovation
activities in alternative energy and energy conservation. The results showed that the
ARRA spending had a negative impact in the short-term (two-year after), but three years
after, it led to positive impact on more innovation, in delayed returns toward
technological energy activities. These results also support the proposition that
technological innovation activities takes time.
As another notable finding, the results showed that innovation activities were
strongly associated with lagged delayed effects of government investments. It is very
noteworthy that temporary government funding evidently played a determinative role in
directly stimulating more energy technology-related innovative activities, in cumulated
returns, at the state level. The technology innovation process is complex and nonlinear,
which occurs between the various stages of the process. It is also made up of many
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institutions, including universities, start-ups, the federal government, and extra-national
institutions, including the relationships between them. In this perspective, this research’s
empirical evidence indicates that innovative activities may require extended timeframes
for more productive return on government investment.
Also, one of the expectations was that state governments with larger magnitudes
of non-government expenditures are more likely to have higher levels of innovation
activities in energy technologies. Inconsistent with this expectation, this research found
that states with greater amounts spent within government projects with non-government
funding participation were associated with decreasing in innovation activities in energy
technologies. Although it was a weak evidence toward significant in Model 1 (alternative
energy production), these results lead readers to infer that technological innovation may
be vulnerable to investments from temporal contracts with non-stable provision (Liang &
Fiorino, 2013).
The statistically insignificant coefficients on several of the variables were
unexpected on the basis of previous research, including financial capacity, electricity
price, presence of de-monopolized electricity market, knowledge stock, the circumstances
that use renewable resources, and the circumstance of state-energy policy, economic
characteristics, and the impact of political ideology occupied by Democrats.
In regards to Federal DOE expenditures, empirical evidence indicates that the
level of expenditures allocated by federal government did not have any relationship at all
levels of innovation activities toward new energy technologies. However, it was
estimated with the whole federal DOE budget. The whole federal DOE budget might not
be enough as proxy for the expenditures, intended for energy technologies development.
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Early, the present study looked at higher electricity prices under the belief that
they would lead to increases in research and patenting activities in energy area (Popp,
2015)22. Stated differently, empirical evidence indicated that higher retail electricity
prices were not associated with higher levels of innovation activities in energy
technologies. Also, although the law enactment for the deregulating of the electricity
market had been expected to accelerate technological innovation, this research’s finding
showed that the presence of competitive electricity market did not have any relationship
with innovation activities in energy technologies. Although the law enactment for the
deregulating of the electricity market had been expected to accelerate technological
innovation, this research showed that the presence of retail competition does not
encourage innovation in the technologies of alternative energy and energy conservation.
In addition, another of expectations was that state governments with longer
accumulated policies implementation experiences related to renewable and energy
efficiency are more likely to have higher levels of innovation activities toward new
energy technologies. Empirical result from this study has shown that the circumstances
of state level-energy policies such as RPS, EERE, and EERPB did not have any
relationship with innovation activities in energy technologies. From the two perspectives
of demand pull and technology push, state level-energy policies such as RPS, EERE, and
EERPB are more closely related to demand-pull strategies than technology-push
strategies. Thus, the experience of RPS, EERE, and EERPB, that are targeted to
renewable power’s generation or efficient equipment installation, might not be

22

In the long run, a 10 percent increase in energy prices leads to a 3.5 percent rise in the number of
energy patents. Most of the response occurs quickly after a change in energy prices
(http://www.nber.org/reporter/2015number4/popp.html).
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associated with the outcome of technology push strategies to boost the launch (or
development) of new energy technologies.
This research’s results also provide empirical confirmation for a number of
hypotheses related to state-specific economic characteristics. The fact that per capita
GDP and population were insignificant on the innovation activities in three different
models. In regard to knowledge stock variables, the results, in three different models, had
shown that states with higher knowledge stock did not have any relationship with the
higher levels of innovation activities related to energy technologies. Lastly, in all
statistical model, the results indicate that state’ political circumstances occupied by the
Democrats identification was not associated with higher rates of innovation activities in
energy technologies. The greater presence of the firms that use renewable energy, also,
were not associated with stimulating in innovation activities in energy technologies.
Conclusion
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was the largest federal
temporary investment as a one-time grant program. The ARRA investment, provided in
seven grant programs through Office of energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, helped
to motivate innovation activities in the alternative energy technologies and energy
conservation technologies.
This study provides empirical results on the program’s effectiveness implemented
under the fiscal decentralization framework. The ARRA relied on many programs being
implemented quickly at the federal, state, and local levels as well as non-government
entities level. These finding have implications that it is important that decentralized
delivery system should be able to distribute the federal expenditure more efficiently for
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promoting of innovation activities toward energy technologies in the future. This study
also notes that the decentralization approach through intergovernmental grants among
federal, state, and local level entities is essential as a new effective method in managing
energy programs.
This analysis of the ARRA temporary expenditures shows clearly that short-term
and temporary funding from the public sectors can provide a cumulative return on
innovative energy activities, despite the previous theoretical scholarship that recognized
only long-term and stable government funding positively affecting technological
innovation. Although discontinuity public sectors’ spending might be disruptive to the
achievement of longer term impact in the post-ARRA period, the empirical evidence
certainly suggests that temporal expenditures, especially in the short-term, could be
effective performance in terms of promoting energy innovation activities.
From this viewpoint, future research should include empirical study of whether
short-term investment can be important for encouraging innovation technologies outcome
distributed into the practical filed as patent publication in the post-ARRA period.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

What lessons can be extracted about the American Recovery Reinvestment Act
(ARRA)’ funds that shaped the era of energy program and what do these lessons suggest
about the role of energy policy toward the U.S. sustainable energy? This three-essay
dissertation sought to address these questions and, in doing so, empirically evaluate
effectiveness of the energy programs that government had implemented in American
Recovery Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Specifically, I first evaluated whether the ARRA
energy efficiency expenditures substantially influenced levels of local government energy
activities. In the second essay, I tested whether ARRA expenditures that aim to increase
jobs were effective at motivating jobs creation in the energy efficiency and renewable
energy sectors. In the final essay, I empirically evaluated the effects of the ARRA
investments designed to spur new technologies, toward alternative energy and energy
conservation, and effectively achieved their stated objectives. All three essays in this
dissertation provide answers to the questions whether they effectively achieved their
stated objectives in regards energy policy field.
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The first essay showed that ARRA funds, expended with the stated intent of
improving energy efficiency, actually helped local governments to make countless
initiatives toward developing and adopting energy efficiency programs and policies. The
competitive process for acquiring ARRA grants at the local level seems to have been an
effective mechanism for the diffusion of more energy efficiency programs and policies, at
least in the short term.
The second essay found that federal DOE funds allocated under the ARRA, to
stimulate the new jobs in the energy efficiency and renewable energy sector, led to
successful policy implementation. This research confirmed that cumulated ARRA
expenditures allocated through State Energy Office (SEO) from federal EERE led to
higher level of job creation in energy efficiency and renewable energy during the ARRA
period. Although the results showed that the ARRA spending had a negative impact in
the short-term (one-year after), these results had been matched the previous proposition
that some states encountered more difficulties to implement ARRA funds which raised
several intergovernmental challenges related to communication and administration
(Carley & Hyman, 2014). Two years after, the ARRA funds led to positive impact on
more job creation. This research’s results support that job creation activities require some
time. It was strongly associated with delayed effects of government investment.
The third essay confirmed that the ARRA funds, implemented under the
decentralized networks, successfully led to stimulate innovative activities in energy
technologies within both categories of alternative energy and energy conservation.
Another finding in third essay was that ARRA funds led to productive cumulative return
on innovation activities toward alternative energy technologies and energy conservation
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technologies during the period of ARRA. These findings has implications that it is
important to inject a decentralization approach through intergovernmental grants
regarding how government expenditures can more efficiently promote innovation
activities in energy technologies. These accomplishments has indicated that temporary
government investment evidently played a determinative role in directly stimulating more
energy technology-related innovative activities.
In light of these findings, how should the national government’s energy policies
improve with respect to investments in sustainable energy?. This dissertation of the
effects of government ARRA investment lends a number of insights into broader trends
associated with the policies toward the energy sustainability. First of all, to achieve
sustainable energy, implementation of the grants under more competitive selection
processes should be considered for an energy policy delivery system for the diffusion of
more energy programs. Competing principals can lead to change the behavior of local
governments as well as non-governmental entities. These process, in competitive grants,
could be contributed to improve program quality and performance in order to provide
more message on sustainable energy and services to the local community.
In addition, the implementation process based upon the competitive functions
dependent on state and local agencies within the decentralization approach (Conlan et al.,
2017, p.7). This dissertation also gave meaningful attention to the ARRA funds
implemented under the decentralized framework; these funds had important impact on
achieving their stated goals during the period of ARRA. Thus, one can conclude,
decentralized delivery system has a greater effect a new method in managing competitive
grants to achieve sustainable energy.
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A second possible lesson is that the presence of the networked governance
structure can be an effective implementation approach to have a higher level of
innovation activities toward sustainable energy. The success of the ARRA funds relied on
many projects being implemented quickly at the federal, state, and local as well as nongovernment entities level. The ARRA functioned as a problem-solver that engaged with a
wide range of federal, state and local partners. Decisions and implementation regarding
energy programs under the networked governance structures had been allowed for greater
flexibility and enhanced objectives which depend on some extent on state and local
government’s perception. The independent authority of state and local governments led to
more motivated actions or plans to match their unique circumstances, being more
effectiveness toward sustainable energy than had been achieved at the national initiative.
Therefore, this dissertation proposes that the effectiveness of federal programs depends
on their function of managing through increasingly interdependent networks of federal,
state, local nonprofit, and private entities. The collaborative networked governance can
deliver significant performance advantages by enhancing the capacity to achieve
sustainable energy. Some actors who have no experiences working across boundaries
should be required to realize their partnership’s potential for national goals (Conlan et al.,
2017).
A third possible lesson is that intergovernmental grants can serve as great devices
for stimulating job creation and innovative technologies in the energy sector.
Intergovernmental grants helped the delivery of complex national initiatives to numerous
states, counties, cities, nonprofits, and private entities in energy programs under the
ARRA. These implementations promoted the effectiveness of federal programs. The
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presence of intergovernmental grants, that assume a bottom-up view of implementation,
can provide a valid picture of energy program delivery.
Finally, the focus of this dissertation on the assessment of the rationale, design,
implementation, and impacts of the ARRA offers opportunities to evaluate the
effectiveness in the ARRA provisions. This dissertation provides empirical evidence of
the effectiveness of ARRA funds spent, as one time and temporary expenditures
according to their stated objectives. The finding of analyses from three different essays
can contribute to the study of local and state government, as well as federal government’s
role in sustainable energy policies. This dissertation can also contribute to policy
adoption, implementation, evaluation literature focused on energy policy. As an
extension of my dissertation, I propose empirical study of whether ARRA investment
might be important for achieving long-term energy policy goals. I also propose to find
the policy instrument to enhance the overall effectiveness of energy policies. In addition,
I propose to find how state government under the meta-governance mechanism can be
engaged in promoting more energy efficiency continuously. Specifically, it will focus on
the impact of the meta-governance mechanism, and whether there is continuation of the
energy program after self-participation of sub-national level’s government under the
ARRA.
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Appendix A. Definition of the Patents Related To Alternative Energy Production
Classification
of Green
Technologies

Description

U.S.
Class

U.S. Subclass

Agricultural Waste
Biofuel
Chemical Waste
Domestic Hot Water Systems
Passive Space Heating
Swimming Pools
Fuel Cell
Fuel from Animal Waste
Gasification
Genetically Engineered Organism

44
44
110
126
52
126
429
44
48
435
257
60
436
75
431
110
405
60
110
210
44
290
60
431
44
376

589
605, 589
235~259, 346
634~680
173.3
561~568
12~46
605
197A, 197R
252.3, 252.35, 254.9
254.11, 257.2,
325~408, 410~431
641.2~641.5
25~33
958
5
235~259, 346
76~78
495~507
235~259, 346
605
589~606
51~54
495~507
5
552
-

60
60

203.1
644.1

Geothermal
Alternative
Energy
Production

Harnessing Energy from man-made waste
Hospital Waste
Hydroelectric
Industrial Waste
Industrial Waste Anaerobic Digestion
Industrial Wood Waste
Inertial (Turbine)
Landfill Gas
Municipal Waste
Nuclear Power : Induced Nuclear Reactions,
processes
Nuclear Power : Reaction Motor with electric
Nuclear Power : Heating motive fluid by nuclear
energy
Nuclear Power Photovoltaic
Refuse derived fuel
Solar Cells

243~265
552
57,82,84~86,90,93~94,
96, 97
Solar Energy
126
561~714
320
101
Solar Thermal Energy
126
561~713
60
641.8 ~641.15
Water Level (Wave or Tide)
405
76~78
60
495~507
Wind
290
44, 55
307
64~66, 82~87
415
2.1
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office. USPTO Green Technology Pilot Program, Retrieved from
http://www.waybetterpatents.com/green_pilot_classes.html
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136
44
438

Appendix B. Definition of the Patents Related To Energy Conservation
Classification
of Green
Technologies

Description

U.S.
Class

U.S. Subclass

Alternative-Power Vehicle
Cathode Ray Tube Circuits
Commuting – HOV, Teleworking

180
315
705
105
105
296
313
180
320
701
310
705
307
700
713
180
180
280
180
73
73
73
73
257

2.1, 2.2, 54.1
150, 151
13
1.1, 1.3
1.1~1.3
180.1~180.5, 181.5
498~512, 567~643
65.1, 65.21
109
22
1~310
35~45
38~41
295~298
300~340
65.21, 65.31
205
200~304.5
65.21
35.01~35.13
112~115
116~119A
121~132
79, 82, 88~90, 93,
99~103
49~71
65.1~65.8
591~598
32~46

Drag Reduction
Electric Lamp & Discharge Devices
Electric Vehicle

Emission Trading (Pollution Credits)
Energy Storage & Distribution

Energy
Conservation

Fuel Cell Powered Vehicles
Human-Powered Vehicle
Hybrid-Powered Vehicle

Incoherent Light Emitter Structure
Land Vehicle – Electric Trains
Land Vehicle – Electric Cars
Optical Systems and Elements
Roadway – Recycled Surface, All Weather
Bikeways
Static Structure

105
180
359
404

52
309.1~309.17
52
404.1~404.5
52
424~442
52
783.1~795.1
Thermal
702
130~136
Transportation
361
19,20,141,152, 218
Watercraft Drive (Electric Powered)
440
6~7
Watercraft Drive (Human Powered)
440
21~32
Wave-Powered Boat Motors
440
9
Wind-Powered Boat Motors
440
8
Wind-Powered Ships
114
102.1~115
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office. USPTO Green Technology Pilot Program, Retrieved from
http://www.waybetterpatents.com/green_pilot_classes.html
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Appendix C. Establishment that Use Renewable Energy Resources in Electric
Power Generation
NAICS
221111
221114
221115
221116
221117
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Economic Data

Description
Hydroelectric power generation
Solar Electric power generation
Wind industries
Geothermal
Biomass
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Appendix D. Cross-Correlation Analysis in Second Essay
(1)ARRA_EERE
(2)ARRA_EERE (t-1)
(3)ARRA_EERE(t-2)
(4)ARRA_EERE(t-3)
(5)Federal DOE budget
(6)Non-Government funds
(7)Democratic Governor
(8) RE Sources
(9) Per Capita Real GDP
(10) Population Density
(11)ARRA in the Block Grant
(12)State Energy Policies

(1)
1.000
0.794
0.469
0.206
-0.025
-0.009
-0.032
0.348
-0.074
0.135
0.505
0.235

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

1.000
0.791
0.533
-0.028
-0.008
0.001
0.224
-0.087
0.139
0.609
0.372

1.000
0.875
-0.028
-0.030
0.036
0.120
-0.081
0.143
0.614
0.523

1.000
-0.0295
-0.029
0.033
0.226
-0.054
0.130
0.485
0.538

1.000
0.028
0.035
-0.001
-0.007
-0.005
-0.017
-0.038

1.000
0.011
-0.028
-0.020
0.059
-0.020
-0.028

1.000
-0.092
-0.095
-0.091
-0.006
-0.078

1.000
0.050
0.140
0.000
0.296

1.000
0.327
-0.041
-0.040

1.000
0.112
0.163

1.000
0.234

1.000
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Appendix E. Cross-Correlation Analysis in Third Essay
(1)

(2)

(1)ARRA_EERE

1.00

(2)ARRA_EERE (t-1)

0.79

1.00

(3)ARRA_EERE (t-2)

0.46

0.79

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

1.00

(4)ARRA_EERE (t-3)

0.20

0.53

0.87

1.00

(5)Federal DOE annual
budget
(6)Non-Government funds

-0.03

-0.03

-0.03

-0.03

-0.00

-0.01

-0.03

-0.03

0.03

1.00

(7)Electricity Price in
Industrial
(8)Electricity Price in
Residential
(9)De-Monopolized
Electricity
(10)Knowledge Stock

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.05

-0.03

-0.05

1.00

0.15

0.19

0.24

0.24

-0.02

-0.06

0.88

1.00

-0.01

0.01

0.04

0.05

-0.04

0.03

0.17

0.20

1.00

0.00

0.02

0.07

0.08

-0.00

-0.01

0.23

0.24

0.40

1.00

(11) RE Sources

0.34

0.22

0.12

0.23

-0.00

-0.03

0.12

0.25

0.02

0.07

1.00

(12) RPS

0.11

0.19

0.28

0.29

0.03

-0.07

0.27

0.42

0.11

0.14

0.18

1.00

(13) EERS

0.23

0.37

0.52

0.54

-0.04

-0.03

0.17

0.33

0.04

0.12

0.30

0.39

1.00

(14) EERPB

0.33

0.43

0.50

0.46

-0.04

0.02

0.18

0.36

-0.01

0.09

0.27

0.44

0.79

1.00

(15)%House Seats by
Democrats
(16)% Senates Seats by
Democrats
(17) Per Capita Real GDP

0.08

0.03

-0.03

-0.02

0.02

0.01

0.40

0.42

0.08

0.05

0.17

0.25

0.15

0.23

1.00

0.02

-0.01

-0.04

-0.04

0.05

-0.03

0.40

0.37

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.29

0.17

0.24

0.88

1.00

-0.07

-0.09

-0.08

-0.05

-0.01

-0.02

0.43

0.35

0.19

0.26

0.05

0.15

-0.04

-0.03

0.15

0.20

1.00

(18) Population

0.45

0.46

0.47

0.42

-0.02

0.01

0.09

0.21

0.21

0.07

0.50

0.13

0.42

0.38

0.12

0.05

0.12

1.00

(19)ARRA in the Block
Grant Types
(20)Unemployment Rate

050

0.61

0.61

0.49

-0.02

-0.02

0.05

0.16

-0.05

-0.04

-0.00

0.11

0.23

0.32

0.04

0.02

-0.04

0.34

1.00

0.59

0.50

0.29

0.14

-0.04

0.04

0.10

0.20

-0.05

-0.07

0.26

0.07

0.13

0.27

0.27

0.16

-0.28

0.23

0.28

1.00
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1.00
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